

# **Uneven waves of commodification, decommodification, and recommodification**

## **Karl Polanyi and the Analysis of Welfare State Transformation**

*[Draft-Version: Please do not cite or circulate!]*

### ***Affiliation:<sup>1</sup>***

Dr. Markus Griesser

Institute for Comprehensive Analysis of the Economy

Johannes Kepler University Linz

*Address:* Altenbergerstraße 69, A-4040 Linz

*Telephone:* +43/732/2468-3412

*E-Mail:* markus.griesser[AT]gmail.com

### ***Table of Contents:***

|  |    |
|--|----|
| (1) Introduction   | 2  |
| (2) Theoretical framework  | 3  |
| (2.1) Labour power as a fictitious commodity                                     | 3  |
| (2.2) The double movement of marketization and social protection                 | 5  |
| (2.3) Summary and hypotheses   | 8  |
| (3) Empirical case studies   | 9  |
| (3.1) The Labour Promotion Act (Arbeitsförderungsgesetz, AFG) of 1969            | 9  |
| (3.2) The Fourth Law for Modern Services in the Labour Market (Hartz IV) of 2005 | 12 |
| (4) Conclusion   | 16 |
| (5) Literature   | 18 |

---

<sup>1</sup> Research for this paper has been supported by funds of the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Anniversary Fund, project number: 15727).

## (1) Introduction

“The members of this board were very sage, deep, philosophical men; and when they came to turn their attention to the workhouse, they found out at once, what ordinary folks would never have discovered – the poor people liked it! It was a regular place of public entertainment for the poorer classes; a tavern where there was nothing to pay [...]. ‘Oho!’ said the board, looking very knowing; ‘we are the fellows to set this to rights; we’ll stop it all, in no time.’ So they established the rule that all poor people should have the alternative (for they would compel nobody, not they) of being starved by a gradual process in the house, or by a quick one out of it.” (Dickens 2012 [1837ff.]: 23)

With these ironical words from his famous novel *Oliver Twist* (published as a serial between 1837 and 1839) British author Charles Dickens commented critically on the *Poor Law Amendment Act* of 1834. With the *less eligibility* rule as its guiding principle, this major reform of the *Old English Poor Laws* consisted of three key measures, namely the complete abolishment of outdoor relief for the “able-bodied poor”, the establishment of a “well-ordered workhouse system” throughout the country, and the creation of a centralized board to control the local administration of the new poor law (e.g. Bohlender 2007: 311ff.). “The board” mentioned by Dickens was the *Royal Commission into the Operation of the Poor Laws*, appointed in 1832, and the “very sage, deep, philosophical men” were people such as Nassau Senior, professor of political economy at Oxford University, or Edwin Chadwick, a lawyer who, at the time, was Jeremy Bentham’s secretary (see *ibid.*: 296ff.). These two men drafted the final report of the commission, thereby laying the basis for the reform of 1834, which marked – according to Karl Polanyi (2001 [1944]: 84/87) – “the starting point of modern capitalism” by establishing a competitive labor market. Polanyi argued that this reform had far-reaching consequences for society, since it implied the risk to “annihilate all organic forms of existence” (*ibid.* 171) as provided by – inter alia – kinship, neighbourhood and religion, and to reorganize them in an atomized and individualized mode.<sup>2</sup> Hence, as Polanyi demonstrated, in the following decades a mechanism of “social defense” (*ibid.* 190) emerged in order to prevent the destruction of society by the system of self-regulating markets. This process, against the backdrop of his interpretation, resulted finally in the development of the welfare state, which was understood as “the quintessence of this social defence” (Lessenich/Ostner 1998: 15).

With his reinterpretation of England’s social history from the late 18th to the early 20th century Polanyi presented, as Matthias Bohlender (2007: 12f.) put it, a “*socialist-democratic*” (sozialistisch-demokratische) counter-narrative to the “*liberalistic* concept of ‘liberalism’” (liberalistisches Konzept des “Liberalismus”) as developed by Albert Venn Dicey and others. This paper draws on Polanyi’s interpretation, more precisely, on two analytical concepts developed by him in the context of his analysis – the concept of labour power as a fictitious commodity and the concept of a double

---

<sup>2</sup> According to Polanyi’s interpretation (2001 [1944]), economic activities in general had hitherto been embedded organically in human social relations (see *ibid.* 45ff.), but the establishment of a self-regulating market in the course of capitalist development resulted in their dis-embedding.

movement of the capitalist development. In so doing the paper argues that a revised version of these concepts continues to provide a useful framework for the analysis of the welfare state. To this end, after introducing the two concepts, they will be applied in the context of two case studies analysing recent welfare state transformations, namely major German labour market policy (LMP) reforms of the 1960s and the 2000s. However, as his analysis of the reform of 1834 indicates, Polanyi largely ignored the significance of the discursive or ideological dimension associated with such transformations.<sup>3</sup> This drawback of his approach is revised by focussing on the discursive frames associated with the LMP reforms mentioned above.

## **(2) Theoretical framework**

This section discusses the concepts of labour power as a fictitious commodity and of capitalist development as a double movement of marketization and social protection as developed by Polanyi and later enhanced and refined by others.

### ***(2.1) Labour power as a fictitious commodity***

In an implicit dialogue with Karl Marx' (1962 [1867]: 184) analysis of labour power as a “peculiar commodity”, Karl Polanyi (2001 [1944]: 71ff.) developed his analytical concept of labour power as a “fictitious commodity” (see e.g. Silver 2005 [2003]: 34ff.; Burawoy 2015: 127f.). In order to clarify its meaning, Polanyi (2001 [1944]: 75) introduced an empirical definition according to which commodities are “objects produced for sale on the market”. In accordance with this definition, labour power as well as land and money must be regarded as fictitious commodities because they are not produced for this purpose. Instead, labour power is closely intertwined with life itself and can thus neither be mobilized nor stored like other commodities.

Nevertheless, with the help of this fiction developed by classical political economy, real markets for these factors have been established and expanded, which – from Polanyi's perspective – meant nothing less than “to subordinate the substance of society itself to the laws of the market” (ibid.). According to him, this application of a market mechanism to the fictitious commodities of labour power, land and money had far-reaching consequences, since “no society could stand the effects of such a system of crude fiction” (ibid. 76). Hence, the mechanism of “social defense” (ibid. 190) emerged in order to stop the expansion of the market and prevent its destructive effects.

---

<sup>3</sup> In fact, Polanyi referred to the report of the aforementioned commission especially in his analysis of the *Speenhamland Act* of 1795. Further, he paid close attention to a far-reaching paradigm shift regarding the history of political thought, namely – as Matthias Bohlender (2007: 141) put it – “the metamorphose of Adam Smith's political economy of wealth into as political economy of poverty”. According to Polanyi (2001 [1944]: 116) this paradigm shift was associated with Joseph Townsend's *Dissertation on the Poor Laws* published in 1786 (see Townsend 2011 [1786]). However, these discursive or ideological changes do not play a significant role in explaining the great transformation analysed by Polanyi.

Polanyi's analytical concept of labour power as a fictitious commodity has been adopted by numerous scholars dealing with the subject of the welfare state and its transformation, most prominently perhaps by Gøsta Esping-Andersen (1990: 36). He proposed re-conceptualizing Polanyi's mechanism of social defence as an attempt to *de-commodify* labour power, that is, to guarantee the means by which "individuals, or families, can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independently of market participation" (ibid.: 37). This means that the welfare state reduces the market dependency of workers by providing social benefits in accordance with certain criteria (e.g., easy access to benefits in terms of eligibility rules, high level of benefits in terms of income replacement, wide range of benefits in terms of covered risks) (see ibid. 21ff./47ff.).

With reference to dialectics of commodification and de-commodification conceived as a general "trade-off" of the modern welfare state" (Lessenich 1998: 96), Esping-Andersen's approach has been criticized for being too narrow and ignoring the other side of the coin – tendencies of (re-)commodification associated with social policy – almost entirely (e.g. Brütt 2011: 22ff.).

In this context, Polanyi insisted on the "artificial", that is, politically mediated, character of the process by which the commodity form was imposed on labour power.<sup>4</sup> Again, an implicit dialogue with Marx (1962 [1867]: 765/770) can be seen, who showed how "[d]irect force, outside economic conditions" transformed peasants made redundant in the course of the so-called *primitive accumulation* into wagedworkers. Implicitly referring to this diagnosis, Polanyi (2001 [1944]: 173) also stated that "[l]egal compulsion and parish serfdom as in England, the rigors of an absolutist labor police as on the Continent, indentured labor as in the early Americas were the prerequisite of the 'willing worker'". Furthermore, both authors agree that such non-economic "pillars" are superficial as soon as the capitalist mode of production is consolidated, since it now reproduces itself primarily by means of the "dull compulsion of economic relations" (Marx (1962 [1867]: 765), in the case of labour power in particular by "the application of 'nature's penalty', hunger" (Polanyi 2001 [1944]: 173).

In an article written together with Gero Lenhardt (2006 [1977]: 164) and elsewhere, Claus Offe referred to Polanyi's analytical concept of labour power as a fictitious commodity in order to develop the idea that social policy is not only concerned with de-commodification in the sense of "de-proletarianization" (Esping-Andersen 1990: 36). Rather, the "de-proletarianization" as seen from Offe and Lenhardt's perspective (2006 [1977]: 157) always entails the "proletarianization" of

---

<sup>4</sup> Polanyi (2001 [1944]) similarly described the establishment of the principle of laissez-faire in general. Specifically, according to him "the road to the free market was opened and kept open by an enormous increase in continuous, centrally organized and controlled interventionism" (ibid. 146): "[T]he market has been the outcome of a conscious and often violent intervention on the part of government which imposed the market organization on society for noneconomic ends" (ibid. 258).

others.<sup>5</sup> In particular, they distinguish between three aspects of this fundamental contradiction of the welfare state: (a) the *preparation* of processes of proletarianization and commodification in relation to the “willingness to work”; (b) the *stabilization* of these processes in relation to the “ability to work”; and (c) the regulation of these processes in relation to the “chances to sell” labour power (see *ibid.* 159ff./169). According to Offe and Lenhardt, the welfare state (as a specific type of capitalist state) is concerned with these problems not only in the early days of capitalism, but throughout its history (see e.g. *ibid.* 162).

Building on such arguments, many scholars distinguish between two major stages in the development of the welfare state in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century: Although characterized by a general dialectics, in the first decades after WWII, tendencies to de-commodify labour power prevailed, while from the mid-1970s onwards (at least in the centres of the capitalist world system) the associated processes slowed down and finally reversed in the sense of tendencies towards its re-commodification (with reference to Polanyi see, e.g., Harvey 2007: 205ff.; Burawoy 2015). Based on this observation, a theory of long waves of commodification, de-commodification, and re-commodification was developed (*ibid.* 137ff.).<sup>6</sup> Regarding the important function of the state to ensure the conditions for the reproduction of labour power, the Fordist era was characterized by a “welfarist” mode of regulation, while in the post-Fordist era a new “workfarist” mode of regulation evolved (see, e.g., Peck 2001; Jessop 2002). An “increasing administrative re-commodification of labour-power” (*ibid.* 159) has been identified as a central feature of workfarism (with reference to Polanyi also see, e.g., Röttger 1997: 182ff.; Atzmüller 2014: 108f./143ff.). Some factors responsible for these developments are outlined in the following section.

## ***(2.2) The double movement of marketisation and social protection***

As previously mentioned, Polanyi interpreted the social history of the “long 19<sup>th</sup> century” in England as the outcome of a “double movement” (Polanyi 2001 [1944]: 79) characterized by two divergent principles of societal organization with (a) different institutional aims, (b) the support of

---

<sup>5</sup> More precisely, Offe and Lenhardt distinguish between *passive* and *active* modes of proletarianization: While the former (i.e., the separation of the producers from their means of production and subsistence) happens “automatically”, the latter (i.e., the “transformation of non-workers into wagedworkers”, that is, their integration into the labour market) is politically mediated. Regarding the dialectical character of this process, Offe and Lenhardt have been criticized for underestimating the aspects of de-proletarianization, that is, the “transformation of (potential) wagedworkers into non-workers” (Vobruba 1983: 194).

<sup>6</sup> Burawoy (2015: 137) perceives “the history of capitalism as a sequence of great transformations”. More precisely, he distinguishes between three long waves of marketization: While the first one started in 1795, culminated in the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 and primarily focused on the commodification of labour power, the second wave started after WWI, culminated in the abolition of the gold standard in 1933 and primarily focused on the commodification of money. A third wave, finally, started in 1973 and primarily focused on the commodification of land. According to Burawoy it will probably culminate in an ecological disaster if it is not stopped by a movement of social protection comparable to those which led to the great transformations of the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century.

different social forces and (c) the application of different methods: On the one hand, the “principle of economic liberalism” aimed to create a self-regulating market system supported by the liberal bourgeoisie and using the method of laissez-faire. On the other hand, the “principle of social protection” sought to defend people, their ecological environment and their productive organization, supported by the working and by the landed classes and using a broad variety of methods ranging from social welfare to protective legislation (see *ibid.* 138f.). According to Polanyi, from the 1830s onwards the principle of economic liberalism was adopted in England with “a crusading passion” (*ibid.* 143), resulting in major reforms.<sup>7</sup> Nonetheless, as early as in the 1860s, a counter-movement associated with the principle of social protection began to emerge in order to defend people, their ecological environment and their productive organization, which caused far-reaching changes from individualism to collectivism (see *ibid.* 171ff.).<sup>8</sup>

Since the mid-1990s Polanyi’s analytical concept of the double movement has been adopted to explain the contradictions associated with the process of neoliberal globalization (for a critical overview see, e.g., Röttger 1997: 33ff.).<sup>9</sup> In German-speaking countries, this line of interpretation was adopted most prominently by Elmar Altvater and Birgit Mahnkopf (1999) in their book *Limits of Globalization*. From their point of view, movements of “dis-” and “re-embedding” of the market represent general tendencies associated with the capitalist mode of production (see *ibid.* 91). Against this backdrop, the two authors offer an interpretation of globalization as “a ‘great transformation’ of the late 20<sup>th</sup> century” (*ibid.* 31) which caused a new quality of atomization (“dis-embedding global”) and established political constraints at the world-market level (see *ibid.* 90ff./114ff.). However, according to Altvater and Mahnkopf, globalization at the same time led to new forms of political agency. These ambivalent effects can be understood with reference to Polanyi’s interpretation according to which “dis-embedding frees up destructive forces which have to be stopped by social counter-movements” (*ibid.* 478). Hence, in their view, the contemporary development of capitalism is also characterized by a double movement.

Concerning the question of what the driving forces behind the double movement are, Polanyi (2001 [1944]) referred to the relevance of social classes, since in his view they can be conceived as “the

---

<sup>7</sup> These reforms concerned the enforcement of international free trade (*Anti-Corn Law Bill of 1846*), the establishment of an automatic gold standard (*Peels Bank Act of 1844*) and, as already mentioned, the creation of a competitive labour market (*Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834*)

<sup>8</sup> In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the contradiction between these two principles ultimately resulted in the collapse of the whole system and in attempts to resolve the crisis by divergent means (Socialism, New Deal, Fascism), but with a unifying anti-liberal consensus (see Polanyi 2001 [1944]: 210ff.).

<sup>9</sup> Perhaps most famously, the concept was used by followers of the so-called Neo-Gramscian approach to international political economy. Hence, Stephen Gill (1995: 66f.), for example, referred to Polanyi in order to analyze, on the one hand, the movement of marketization, which accompanied the process of neoliberal globalization, and, on the other hand, the counter-movements aiming at a democratization of politics and at a socially inclusive and ecologically sustainable creation of wealth.

natural vehicle of social and political change” (ibid. 159). On the one hand, different social classes supported (in the case of the bourgeoisie) or resisted (in the case of the working or the landed classes) the expansion of market forces. On the other hand, from Polanyi’s philosophical viewpoint, the movement associated with social protection had nothing to do with the interests of particular social classes but with “the interests of society” (ibid. 169) as such.<sup>10</sup>

In critical opposition to this relatively deterministic and idealistic perspective, recent theories drawing on Polanyi’s work insist, firstly, on the influence of, for example, political and ideological struggles to the double movement and, secondly, on the openness and indecisiveness of these struggles in which various social actors engaged (see, e.g., Burawoy 2003: 227ff.; Altvater 2006: 167). Furthermore, the positions taken by different social actors are not conceived as stable. Hence, based on the distinction between progressive and conservative forms of social defence, Altvater and Mahnkopf (1999), for example, see a change in the positioning of the labour movement from a progressive stance in the framework of the first great transformation (as analysed by Polanyi) to a conservative stance in the framework of the more recent one (as indicated by their analysis). The role of advocating a progressive alternative has been taken up by social actors such as NGOs and new social movements which promote a new framework on a global level (ibid. 121ff.).

Alongside attempts to use Polanyi’s analytical concept of the double movement to explain recent developments, another line of discussion seeks to refine them. In this context, Beverly J. Silver (2007 [2005]: 36), for example, criticizes the shortcomings of the concept that are due to its analytical desideratum regarding questions of power. Therefore, she proposes distinguishing between two forms of societal resistance to the processes of marketisation: a Polanyian type, which is characterized by a pendulum movement and by defensive forms of resistance carried out by established and often privileged fractions of the working class, and a Marxian type, which is characterized by a sequence of stages and by offensive forms of struggles taken up primarily by emerging fractions of the working class (see ibid: 38).<sup>11</sup>

Another attempt to refine Polanyi’s analytical concept of the double movement is provided by Nancy Fraser (2015 [2013]), who introduces the analytical concept of a “triple movement”, which adds a third pole to Polanyi’s dichotomy between marketisation and social defence, namely the

---

<sup>10</sup> Since in Polanyi’s (2001 [1944]) view the social defence measures resulted from “objective reasons of a stringent nature” (ibid. 154) and must thus be conceived as a “spontaneous reaction” (ibid. 156) of societal self-defence against the threat posed by the free market, they cannot be traced back to particular interests but must be viewed as resulting from common interest. Hence, interests of a particular class are enforced (e.g., the interests of landowners in the case of the Speenhamland Act) because they, “even though incidentally, stand for developments only seemingly contrary to the general interest of the community” (ibid. 194).

<sup>11</sup> Thus, in the 1980s the neoliberal withdrawal from the social contract provoked Polanyian types of resistance in the centres of the capitalist world system, for instance, among British miners and Italian workers in the automobile industry, while on the (semi-)periphery Marxian types of struggles were put up, for instance, by Polish shipyard workers and Brazilian workers in the automobile industry (see Silver 2007 [2005]: 205f.).

“principle of emancipation”, which seeks to abolish various forms of domination and is supported by (new) social movements that emerged since the 1960s (ibid. 109ff.).<sup>12</sup> Lastly, Michael Brie (2015: 48ff.) (while questioning its overall analytical benefit) draws on this model developed by Fraser for his “fourfold movement”, which combines the axis of marketisation and social defence with an axis of domination and emancipation. He thus tries to capture theoretically the fact that, from his perspective, real movements can mediate societal contradictions not only in emancipatory but also in authoritarian ways (see ibid. 57).

### ***(2.3) Summary and hypotheses***

In summary, in the social sciences a lively debate is still ongoing about Polanyi’s two key concepts discussed in this paper, namely labour power as a fictitious commodity and the double movement of marketisation and social protection. Hence, many scholars have adopted or refined these concepts in order to explain recent social developments and, in particular, the transformation of the welfare state. For our purpose, several aspects are of special interest:

On the one hand, analysing the impact of welfare state transformation on the reproduction of labour power conceived as a fictitious commodity implies the question of effects of de- and re-commodification with respect to, for example, the level of benefits to cover certain social risks, such as unemployment. In this context, two important hypotheses emerge from the studies reviewed above: firstly, the hypothesis of a dialectics between de- and re-commodification of labour power associated with the welfare state in general (as it follows from the interpretation, e.g., of Esping-Andersen and Offe); and, secondly, the hypothesis of long waves leading to dominant tendencies to de-commodify labour power in the Fordist welfare state and to re-commodify it in the post-Fordist welfare state (as it derives from the theoretical considerations of Jessop, Peck and others).

On the other hand, analysing welfare state transformation in terms of the analytical concept of a double movement between marketisation and social protection implies the question of the social forces that support or resist the guiding principle associated with these movements. Again, two hypotheses can be derived from the literature reviewed above: firstly, that it is an empirical question which collective actors are supporting – or opposing – these movements due to, inter alia, changing positions over time (as, e.g., the interpretation of Altvater and Mahnkopf or Silver suggests); and secondly, that, in addition to the “traditional” actors associated with certain social classes and political alignments (e.g., organizations of employers and workers; liberal and socialist parties), there are “new” actors (e.g., ecological movements) with an even less clear and defined positioning

---

<sup>12</sup> Since from her perspective a “coherent counter-project to neoliberalism” (Fraser 2015 [2013]: 102) is missing, Fraser proposes recalling the dangerous liaisons of certain fractions of the emancipatory movements with neoliberalism in favor of new alliances between them and progressive forces behind social defense (see ibid. 115).

in this context (as the article concludes, *inter alia*, from the reviewed theories of Fraser and Brie).

### **(3) Empirical case studies**

The conceptual considerations presented in the previous section provide the analytical framework for empirical case studies of two major LMP reforms in Germany in the 1960s and in the 2000s. I focus on the *Labour Promotion Act* (*Arbeitsförderungsgesetz, AFG*) of 1969 and the *Fourth Law for Modern Services in the Labour Market* (*Viertes Gesetz für Moderne Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt*) of 2005, better known as *Hartz IV*. These two reforms can be considered landmark reforms regarding the implementation of *active* and *activating* LMPs in Germany (see Pühringer/Griesser 2016) and represent important policy changes closely related to the de-commodifying welfare state of the 1960s and to the re-commodifying workfare state of the 2000s.

From a Polanyian perspective, I examine the processes of marketisation and/or social protection associated with these reforms in terms of their de- and/or re-commodifying impacts on labour power (understood as a fictitious commodity) and in terms of the major forces in support of – and in opposition to – these reforms. Empirically, I draw on an analysis of the parliamentary debates concerned with the two reforms in order to explore the discursive frames and important actors. More precisely, a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) focussing mainly on instruments developed by the Duisburg School of CDA was performed (see Fairclough/Wodak 1997: 267f.; Jäger 2012).<sup>13</sup>

#### **(3.1) The Labour Promotion Act (*Arbeitsförderungsgesetz, AFG*) of 1969**

##### **(3.1.1) Context**

In 1966/67, the first economic downturn after more than a decade of prosperity and full employment resulted in rising unemployment in the German labour market. In response to the crisis, a grand coalition of Christian Democrats (CDU) and Social Democrats (SPD) was formed and Hans Katzer (CDU) was appointed minister for social affairs. In 1969 he launched the *Labour Promotion Act* (AFG). With the AFG, an active LMP was introduced in order to fight unemployment, labour shortages and so-called “inferior employment” in a more preventive and flexible way. Hence, in addition to the traditional (passive) means of LMP (unemployment benefits, job placement) a wide range of (active) measures was introduced. These active measures primarily sought to improve the mobility of labour power (e.g. Schmid/Oschmiansky 2006).

Regarding the process of policy-making a first draft of the AFG was developed by civil servants in the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (BMAsV) and was later coordinated with the

---

<sup>13</sup> The exclusive focus on parliamentary debates is for pragmatic reasons and is not intended to privilege parliaments over other political arenas (for an analysis of media and academic expert discourses concerning these reforms see Pühringer/Griesser 2016; for an analysis of think tank discourses concerning the Hartz IV reform see Griesser 2012).

other departments and with the social partners. In November 1967, it was presented to the German Bundestag, where it was assigned to the Parliamentary Committee for Work. Between January 1968 and April 1969, the committee debated the bill in numerous meetings including a public hearing that involved the social partners and academic advisors. In May 1969, the second and third readings of the substantially revised bill took place in the Bundestag. After unanimous adoption by the Bundestag in May, the AFG was adopted by the Bundesrat (Federal Council) in June and came into force on July 1, 1969, after one and a half year of debate and modification (e.g. Altmann 2004).

### ***(3.1.2) General remarks regarding the climate of the debate and the stakeholders<sup>14</sup>***

The climate of the parliamentary discussions regarding the AFG, be it in the Bundestag or in the Bundesrat, was quite harmonious and consensual. Accordingly, the participants praised the joint search for the “objectively best solution” (Folger/SPD: 12932) across all ideological or doctrinal arguments (see, e.g., Katzer/CDU-CSU: 12925; Schmidt/FDP: 12934). In fact, the most important controversy evolved around the question of who had invented the underlying concepts of the AFG, since virtually all parties laid claims to the associated “primogeniture” or “copyright” (Diebäcker/CDU-CSU: 7414; Müller/CDU-CSU: 7417; Schmidt/FDP: 12910; Katzer/CDU-CSU: 12936). This was true for representatives of the SPD who were convinced that the draft largely plagiarised social democratic proposals (see, e.g., Folger/SPD: 7408; Behrendt/SPD: 7420; Lier/SPD: 12908). The FDP, too, stated that the AFG was based in ideas developed by the German liberals (see, e.g., Schmidt/FDP: 7410/12910). And even though Minister Katzer advanced that “success has many fathers” (Katzer/CDU-CSU: 12936), representatives of the CDU/CSU faction also declared that it was their Christian democratic impulse that had stimulated the process related to the AFG (see, e.g., Müller/CDU-CSU: 12931). Nonetheless, the overall consensual character of the parliamentary discussion resulted in the conclusion that instead of “conducting a debate, a great many of commemorative speeches had been given on this law” (Schmidt/FDP: 12933).

Accordingly, it was in particular the representatives of the governing parties who welcomed the general objectives of the AFG (see, e.g., Porten/CDU-CSU: 12902; Lier/SPD: 12908) and agreed on the remarkable impact of the reform (see, e.g., Müller/CDU-CSU: 12929/12905; Jaschke/SPD: 7419). The main differences of opinion, therefore, emerged with regard to certain matters of detail. This holds true, inter alia, for questions concerning the types of funding of the active measures, via social insurance contributions, as favoured by CDU/CSU and FDP (see, e.g., Katzer/CDU-CSU:

---

<sup>14</sup> Quotations in the following paragraphs are from the parliamentary debates regarding the AFG and are translated into English by the author. The debates took place on the 13<sup>th</sup> of December 1967 (BT-Minutes V/143: S. 7400-7422) and on the 13<sup>th</sup> of May 1969 (BT-Minutes V/234: 12902-12938) in the German Bundestag (BT) and on the 20<sup>th</sup> of June 1969 (BR-Minutes V/340: 160-163) in the German Bundesrat (BR). All in all, 13 speakers of the different parliamentary factions (the conservative CDU/CSU, the social democratic SPD and the liberal FDP) were involved in the first BT-debate, 21 speakers in the second BT-debate and two speakers in the BR-debate.

7404; Müller CDU/CSU: 7406f./12930f.; Schmidt/FDP: 7412f.; Porten/CDU-CSU: 12904), or through taxes, as the SPD demanded (see, e.g., Folger/SPD: 7409f.; Behrendt/SPD: 7421; Jaschke/SPD: 12906; Heinsen/SPD: 162). A comparable controversy concerned the question of who would be eligible for the new benefits, namely only the unemployed or also employees and (formerly) self-employed persons like farmers (see, e.g., Katzer/CDU-CSU: 7403; Horstmeier/CDU-CSU: 7422). In the perspective mainly of representatives of the SPD, the latter would require a different type of funding, because e.g. farmers had not paid into unemployment insurance (see, e.g., Folger/SPD: 12932; Behrendt/SPD: 7420; Porten/CDU-CSU: 7418/12903).

In spite of these divergences, politicians of all parties already hinted at a “general agreement” (Diebäcker/CDU-CSU: 7414) with the draft at an early stage of the debate, mentioning its “progressiveness” (Folger/SPD: 7408/12932) and “reasonableness” (Schmidt/FDP: 7410/12934).

### ***(3.1.3) Conceptions of the state/market relationship: the de-/commodification of labour power***

With respect to dominant conceptions of the state/market relationship in parliamentary debates associated with the AFG dis-equilibrium, be it in the form of unemployment, labour shortages or the so-called “inferior employment” were conceived as a common phenomenon regarding the labour market. This phenomenon was partly perceived as the outcome of seasonal and cyclical trends, most importantly of the crisis of 1966/67 (see, e.g., Heinsen/SPD: 160; Katzer/CDU-CSU: 7403f.; Wolf/SPD: 12920). However, in the long run, structural trends inherent in the dynamics of the economy in general were more important (see *ibid.*). These included first and foremost the technological development, which was broadly associated with the terms “automation”, “mechanisation” and “rationalisation” (Schmidt/FDP: 7411f.; Jaschke/SPD: 7419; Ziegler/CDU-CSU: 12913). Therefore, the AFG was primarily intended to resolve these problems associated on the one hand with a seasonal and cyclical “mismatch” through instruments like short-time allowances or bad weather allowances and, on the other hand, with regional or occupational “mismatches” through instruments like mobility allowances and qualification measures. Thus the overall goal of the active LMP associated with the AFG was to promote the (e.g. regional or occupational) mobility of labour power. Linked to this goal was the new approach of fighting dis-equilibrium on the labour market in advance instead of correcting it afterwards (see, e.g., Katzer/CDU-CSU: 7401; Müller CDU/CSU: 7405ff; Schmidt/FDP: 7411; Heinsen/SPD: 161) in order to prevent “locking the stable door after the horse has bolted” (Jaschke/SPD: 7419/12905).

Precisely in the face of the aforementioned structural changes of the economy, even conservative politicians agreed that also liberal forms of LMP needed “clear-sighted planning” (Müller/CDU-CSU: 12929) in order to reach the goal of full employment. Hence, even though politicians of the different parties shared the conviction that compared to “coercion” (associated with the state),

“incentives” (associated with the market) represented a better choice (see, e.g., Schroeder CDU/CSU: 12919; Wolf/SPD: 12920f.), a broad consensus was reached concerning the necessity of political interventions in order to correct economic imbalances. In the case of the labour market this was true not only for economic but also for social reasons, which was why LMP had to fulfil a “dual function [...] for the people and for the economy” (Müller CDU/CSU: 7408/12929). Consequently, social democratic politicians were pleased that the “times when the faith in planning was quite limited are overcome” (Wolf/SPD: 12920) and that measures were finally implemented which once had been subject to the criticism that “planning should be reduced in order to leave things to the free play of market forces” (Folger/SPD: 7408). In this context, differences of opinion only emerged when the proposed measures were perceived to intervene directly into “the relationship between employers and employees organized under private law“ (Ziegler/CDU-CSU: 12914). This was true, inter alia, for the SPD proposal to introduce a right to a leave of absence for the purpose of vocational training, which was rejected by CDU/CSU and FDP (see, e.g., Behrendt/SPD: 7420; Lier/SPD: 12909; Jaschke/SPD: 12905; Schmidt/FDP: 12935).<sup>15</sup>

Closely related to this “planning euphoria” were two additional aspects: namely, on the one hand, the conviction that employment research, that is, the scientific observation, registration, analysis and prediction regarding processes on the labour market had to be an integral feature of LMP, since they provided the basis for rational planning (see, e.g., Katzer/CDU-CSU: 7403; Müller/CDU-CSU: 7406; Schmidt/FDP: 7411; Wolf/SPD: 12920; Heinsen/SPD: 160). On the other hand, politicians of all parties insisted on the “embeddedness” of LMP into a macroeconomic framework, since full employment as its “ultimate goal” (Müller/CDU-CSU: 12929) could only be reached in close coordination with other policy measures, first and foremost a counter-cyclical economic policy (see, e.g., Katzer/CDU-CSU: 7404/12936; Schmidt/FDP: 7411; Jaschke/SPD: 7419). At the same time, it was agreed that LMP could not be reduced to this economic dimension but also had a social dimension and therefore should be understood as a “societal policy” (Gesellschaftspolitik) in a comprehensive sense (ibid.; Behrendt/SPD: 7421; Müller/CDU-CSU: 12931).

### **(3.2) The Fourth Law for Modern Services in the Labour Market (Hartz IV) of 2005**

#### ***(3.2.1) Context***

In 2001/2 an economic downturn put an end to the short recovery phase of the late 1990s and led to a further increase in the already high unemployment rates in Germany. In response to the crisis, the

---

<sup>15</sup> Comparable discussions emerged with respect to the proposal to establish a duty of notification for employers in case of organizational changes that would lead to layoffs. Nonetheless, the parliamentary committee finally reached an agreement to introduce this measure in the AFG (see, e.g., Folger/SPD: 7409; Behrendt/SPD: 7420; Porten/CDU-CSU: 12903; Müller/CDU-CSU: 12908/12929; Folger/SPD: 12932).

governing coalition between the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Green Party under the leadership of chancellor Gerhard Schröder (SPD) initiated a far-reaching policy change. In February 2002 Schröder established the “Modern Services in the Labour Market” expert commission chaired by Peter Hartz, at that time Director of Human Resources of the Volkswagen AG. After Schröder won the elections in 2002, Wolfgang Clement (SPD) was appointed minister for economic affairs and labour.<sup>16</sup> He immediately started to implement the proposals of the commission by presenting four bills on “Modern Services in the Labour Market”, better known as “Hartz I-IV”. Especially the last of these bills, the new “Basic Provision for Jobseekers”, which was established by the Hartz IV legislation in 2005, marked the final breakthrough of an activating LMP in Germany. Hence, its primary aim is to strengthen “personal responsibility” and promote “economic independency” by ensuring rapid re-integration of the unemployed into the labour market (e.g. Griesser 2012).

Regarding the process of policy-making the first draft of Hartz IV was developed by civil servants in the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Labour (BMWA) on the basis of proposals presented by a working group of the governing coalition, which itself referred to the final report of the aforementioned expert commission. In September 2003, the bill was presented in the German Bundestag, where the first reading took place. Subsequently, the bill was assigned to the Parliamentary Committee for Work and Economic Affairs. The committee debated the bill between September and October 2003 in only six meetings, one of which was a public hearing that included the social partners and academic advisors. In October 2003, the second and third readings of the marginally revised bill took place in the Bundestag and ended with its adoption by the members of the governing parties. However, in November 2003 the bill was rejected by the (conservative-dominated) Bundesrat in favour of an alternative bill proposed by the Christian Democrats of the State of Hesse. A conciliation committee was subsequently established which reached an agreement in the form of a new bill that was adopted by the Bundestag and the Bundesrat in December 2003 and that came into force on January 1, 2005 (e.g. Hassel/Schiller 2010).

### ***(3.2.2) General remarks regarding the climate of the debate and the stakeholders<sup>17</sup>***

In contrast to the parliamentary debates regarding the AFG, the climate of the discussions regarding

---

<sup>16</sup> An important change took place at the institutional level after the Schröder administration was re-elected in October 2002, as the former Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs – which was traditionally closely affiliated to representatives of the employees in both of the major parties – was broken up and the Labour Department was merged with the former Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (see, e.g., Hassel/Schiller 2010: 227).

<sup>17</sup> Quotations in the following paragraphs are from the parliamentary debates regarding Hartz IV and are translated into English by the author. The debates took place on the 11<sup>th</sup> of September 2003 (BT-Minutes XV/60: S. 5103-5140) and on the 17<sup>th</sup> of October 2003 (BT-Minutes XV/67: 5736-5758) in the German Bundestag (BT) and on the 7<sup>th</sup> of November 2003 (BR-Minutes XV/793: 398-412) in the German Bundesrat (BR). All in all, 13 speakers of the different parliamentary factions (the social democratic SPD, the ecological Green Party, the conservative CDU/CSU, the liberal FDP and the socialist PDS) were involved in the first BT-debate, nine speakers in the second BT-debate and eight speakers in the BR-debate.

Hartz IV was – be it in the Bundestag or in the Bundesrat – distinctly disharmonious and controversial. Hence, pleas for a debate beyond all ideological considerations (see, e.g., Clement/SPD: 5107; Laumann/CDU-CSU: 5112) were articulated as often as complaints regarding a “highly ideological debate” (Dückert/Grüne: 5114; Schauerte/CDU-CSU: 5114; Koch/CDU-CSU: 5741). Frequently, these disputes culminated in verbal attacks in which political opponents like trade unionists were for instance accused of “class struggle arguments” (Westerwelle/FDP: 5747) or denounced as “Stalinists of economic policy” (Brüderle/FDP: 5118). Nonetheless, right from the start of the debate, the major opposition parties CDU/CSU and FDP sent signals to the governing parties that they were interested in reaching a solution and willing to cooperate (see, e.g., Laumann/CDU-CSU: 5112; Niebel/FDP: 5129; Schauerte/CDU-CSU: 5140). Therefore, the main accusation was not that the government was doing the wrong thing, but that the things it was doing needed to be more consistent and radical (e.g. Laumann/CDU-CSU: 5110) since “you cannot fight the cancer of unemployment with chamomile tea” (Singhammer/CDU-CSU: 5750).

Consequently, with respect to the overall goals and the essential features of Hartz IV, a broad consensus between the government and the opposition was expressed (see, e.g., Laumann/CDU-CSU: 5112; Hajduk/Grüne: 5126; Fuchtel/CDU-CSU: 5131; Clement/SPD: 5738).<sup>18</sup> First and foremost, this was true for the key component of the reform, namely the abolition of two long-established social welfare systems (Unemployment Assistance, Social Assistance) in favour of a new system called Basic Provision for Jobseekers (see, e.g., Laumann/CDU-CSU: 5112; Hajduk/Grüne: 5126; Niebel/FDP: 5129; Fuchtel/CDU-CSU: 5131; Koch/CDU-CSU: 5740; Singhammer/CDU-CSU: 5751). In an astonishing move, the establishment of these systems, which had been essential features of the conservative-corporatist German welfare state, was discursively framed as an accident of history which had to be resolved, mainly for reasons of financial efficiency, of administrative efficacy, and of social justice (see, e.g., Clement/SPD: 5106f./5738; Dückert/Grüne: 5115/5744; Brandner/SPD: 5748). Despite this basic consensus, several differences between the government and the opposition can be identified. This was true, *inter alia*, for the question of whether the Federal Labour Office (as the government demanded) (see, e.g., Clement/SPD: 5106f./5738f.; Brandner/SPD: 5748f.) or the communes (as the opposition wanted) (see, e.g., Laumann/CDU-CSU: 5112/5756; Niebel/FDP: 5129; Fuchtel/CDU-CSU: 5131; Singhammer/CDU-CSU: 5751; Koch/CDU-CSU: 5741/5743; Westerwelle/FDP: 5747) should be the responsible bodies for the new system.

---

<sup>18</sup> In the parliamentary debates this consensus was only questioned by Petra Pau, then member of the socialist PDS, who stated that “the whole approach, the philosophy of the law is wrong” (Pau/fraktionslos: 5752). More precisely, she argued in the context of two speeches in the Bundestag that the reform should be questioned for its social consequences (e.g. impoverishment) as well as for its economic implications (e.g. loss of purchasing power) which would further aggravate the problem of unemployment.

In the course of the final reading of the bill, the dissent articulated by the opposition mainly focused on the concessions the government had made to critics within its own ranks during negotiations in the parliamentary committee. This was true not so much for the additional allowance regarding old-age provision (see, e.g., Clement/SPD: 5738; Roth/SPD: 5754), but for the question whether a job offer could be refused when the wage level was below negotiated or local standards. This rule, which was integrated into the revised bill, led to an outcry amongst the opposition (see, e.g., Koch/CDU-CSU: 5741f.; Westerwelle/FDP: 5746f.), which argued that “it is insanity, it is idiocy, it is wrong” (Laumann/CDU-CSU: 5757). Thus there was no doubt that they would make use of their majority in the Bundesrat in order to reject the bill and to establish a conciliation committee (see, e.g., *ibid.* 5756; Koch/CDU-CSU: 5740; Westerwelle/FDP: 5748). This committee subsequently withdrew the aforementioned concessions and enforced other modifications.

### ***(3.2.3) Conceptions of the state/market relationship: the de-/commodification of labour power***

With respect to dominant conceptions of the state/market relationship in the parliamentary debates associated with Hartz IV, equilibrium on the labour market was framed as the norm. Disequilibrium, in the form of unemployment, was therefore perceived as a consequence of institutional failure, which, *inter alia*, prevented a differentiation of the wage structure in accordance with the market system. Hence, even social democratic politicians agreed that the ultimate goal of the reform should be to “discard existing restraints” and to “liberate the innovative forces which are related to private initiative and competition” (Clement/SPD: 5105/5740) as the silver bullet for stimulating growth and employment. This liberal faith in the healing powers of the market forces was grounded in the conviction that the “structural problems” on the German labour market called for “structural reforms of the social security system” (Dückert/Grüne: 5114) which, *inter alia*, had to comprise a reduction in non-wage labour costs, a deregulation of the labour market and a hollowing out of collective agreements.<sup>19</sup> It was in particular the representatives of the opposition who focussed on the “exclusion” of low-skilled workers by the aforementioned labour market institutions in this context, which were held responsible for the relocation of low-skilled jobs to Eastern Europe (see, e.g., Laumann/CDU-CSU: 5112f.; Koch/CDU-CSU: 5741). According to them, this process could be reversed by the creation of a broad low-wage sector in Germany, which would establish the conditions for a market-clearing equilibrium price, that is “a model in which employment has to be accepted at the price it is offered on the market” (*ibid.* 5742).

---

<sup>19</sup> Against this backdrop, in particular liberal politicians intensified their calls for a “renewal of the market economy” (Westerwelle/FDP: 5746): “The solution of the problem [...] lies in the withdrawal of the state, in a real reduction of taxes, in a real dismantling of bureaucracy and in a real reform of the social security systems” (Brüderle/FDP: 5119). This, in turn, opened the possibility for the government to present itself as the social alternative to neoliberalism (see, e.g., Dücker/Grüne: 5743) in the sense of the question: “Manchester capitalism pure and simple or [...] social equilibrium” (Brandner/SPD: 5136).

Therefore, Hartz IV primarily was intended to resolve these problems by means of a quick re-integration of the able-bodied poor into the labour market (see, e.g., Clement/SPD: 5106), in other words, a “paradigm shift in policy: away from exclusion and towards integration” (Dücker/Grüne: 5115). This overall goal of the activating LMP associated with Hartz IV was closely linked to the leading principle of “help and hassle” (Fördern und Fordern) (ibid. 5745; Clement/SPD: 5738; Brandner/SPD: 5748; Roth/SPD: 5753), which was intended to prevent “social dependency” (Dücker/Grüne: 5115) – particularly amongst the young – by a mixture of incentives and disincentives. The resulting form of conditionality which tied established entitlements to new requirements was strongly supported by the opposition (see, e.g., Laumann/CDU-CSU: 5756; Brüderle/FDP: 5117), which, inter alia, insisted that in the light of this principle workfare measures should not be conceived as “forced labour” but simply as “offers” (which could not be refused) (Koch/CDU-CSU: 5742).

Regarding the macroeconomic framework, besides “structural reforms” (e.g. tax reductions, liberalization of product, service, and capital markets), an “adequate monetary policy” by the European Central Bank and a “consolidated budget” (Clement/SPD: 5103) were seen as crucial prerequisites for the success of this LMP approach. With respect to the latter, an improvement of communal budgets and a reduction of costs used for consumption (freeing funds for investment) were the main demands (see, e.g., ibid. 5104; Fuchtel/CDU-CSU: 5130).

#### **(4) Conclusion**

As mentioned above, analysing the impact of welfare state transformation on the reproduction of labour power conceived as a fictitious commodity implies asking for its effects of de- and re-commodification. Against this backdrop, the AFG (within the context of a general extension of the German welfare state) marked a significant shift towards de-commodification due to two key aspects: Firstly, with respect to the passive means of LMP in the context – and in preparation<sup>20</sup> – of the reform the established system of unemployment benefits was improved and less restrictive conditions were applied. Secondly, also the newly established active means of LMP (e.g. mobility allowances, qualification measures) intended to support the unemployed confronted with an all-powerful and unpredictable market process. Hartz IV, in contrast, (within the context of a general restructuring of the German welfare state) marked a significant shift towards re-commodification: On the one hand, regarding the passive means of LMP, the reform caused a far-reaching change due

---

<sup>20</sup> Due to, inter alia, the economic development, numerous proposals originally debated in the context of the AFG were already implemented in 1966 and 1967. This is true for several minor LMP reforms, which, for instance, caused an increase of unemployment benefits and the establishment of the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) associated with the Federal Employment Agency (see, e.g., Altmann 2004: 151ff.; Schmid/Oschmiansky 2006: 350ff.).

to the replacement of existing schemes by a new one.<sup>21</sup> On the other hand, the re-orientation of the whole system in accordance with the activating principle of “help and hassle” resulted in a new form of conditionality through which established entitlements were tied to requirements like participation in workfare measures or acceptance of subsidized employment in the low-wage sector. All in all, this implied a more restrictive manner of imposing the commodity form on labour power. With respect to the hypotheses mentioned above, the following conclusions can be drawn: Firstly, the results of the research presented in this article confirm the hypothesis (derived from the theories, e.g., of Jessop and Peck) that the dominant tendencies to de-commodify labour power in the Fordist welfare state were replaced by tendencies of its re-commodification in the post-Fordist workfare state. Nonetheless, the analysed reforms of LMP also illustrate the fact that the welfare state in general is characterized by a dialectics of de- and re-commodification and, thus, cannot be reduced to one of these tendencies (as my interpretation of, e.g., Esping-Andersen and Offe suggested). Due to the exclusive (and probably misleading) focus on parliamentary debates, it is far more difficult to draw conclusions regarding, secondly, the double movement of capitalist development. Nonetheless, as the changing positions of the social democratic (but also of the conservative and liberal) parties suggest, it is less a theoretical than an empirical question which collective stakeholders support the principles of economic liberalism and of social protection, respectively. At the same time, “new” actors on the parliamentary level like, for instance, the ecological Greens (or the socialist PDS) showed that their positioning in this context is even more vague and undefined. In the end, therefore, regarding the double movement between marketisation and social protection, it remains an open and contested question which tendency will win and what form it will take. More precisely, whether offensive or defensive forms of struggle are chosen (as suggested by Silver), whether conservative or progressive means of social defence are preferred (as suggested by Altvater and Mahnkopf), and whether emancipatory or authoritarian solutions are enforced (as suggested by Fraser or Brie) can only be decided on the basis of an analysis of the discursive or ideological frames and of the social and political balances of power. Jessop (2007: 261) therefore spoke of “*uneven* waves of commodification, decommodification, and recommodification”.

---

<sup>21</sup> In conjunction with measures implemented by other laws like Hartz III or the Labour Market Reform Act (Gesetz zu Reformen am Arbeitsmarkt), this reform caused a far-reaching transformation of the German welfare state. With respect to the social risk of unemployment, thus, the conservative principle of securing people’s standard of living was replaced by the liberal principle of securing their subsistence as the dominant principle (e.g. Griesser 2012).

## (5) Literature

- Altmann, Georg (2004): *Aktive Arbeitsmarktpolitik. Entstehung und Wirkung eines Reformkonzepts in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*. Stuttgart.
- Altvater, Elmar (2006): "Die zerstörerische Schöpfung. Kapitalistische Entwicklung zwischen Zivilisierung und Entzivilisierung". In: *PROKLA* 143 / Juni 2006, S. 157-175
- Altvater, Elmar/Mahnkopf, Birgit (2007 [1999]): *Grenzen der Globalisierung. Ökonomie, Ökologie und Politik in der Weltgesellschaft*. Münster.
- Atzmüller, Roland (2014): *Aktivierung der Arbeit im Workfare-Staat. Arbeitsmarktpolitik und Ausbildung nach dem Fordismus*. Münster.
- Bohlender, Matthias (2007): *Metamorphosen des liberalen Regierungsdenkens. Politische Ökonomie, Polizei und Pauperismus*. Weilerwilt.
- BR-Minutes V/340: *Protokoll der 340. Sitzung des Deutschen Bundesrats am 20. Juni 1969*. Bonn: Deutscher Bundesrat.
- BR-Minutes XV/793: *Protokoll der 793. Sitzung des Deutschen Bundesrats am 7. November 2003*. Berlin: Deutscher Bundesrat.
- Brie, Michael (2015): *Polanyi neu entdecken. Das hellblaue Bändchen zu einem möglichen Dialog von Nancy Fraser und Karl Polanyi*. Hamburg.
- Brütt, Christian (2011): *Workfare als Mindestsicherung. Von der Sozialhilfe zu Hartz IV*. Bielefeld.
- BT-Minutes V/143: *Protokoll der 143. Sitzung des Deutschen Bundestags am 13. Dezember 1967*. Bonn: Deutscher Bundestag.
- BT-Minutes V/234: *Protokoll der 234. Sitzung des Deutschen Bundestags am 13. Mai 1969*. Bonn: Deutscher Bundestag.
- BT-Minutes XV/60: *Protokoll der 60. Sitzung des Deutschen Bundestags am 11. September 2003*. Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag.
- BT-Minutes XV/67: *Protokoll der 67. Sitzung des Deutschen Bundestags am 17. Oktober 2003*. Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag.
- Burawoy, Michael (2003): "For a Sociological Marxism: The Complementary Convergence of Antonio Gramsci and Karl Polanyi". In: *Politics & Society*, Vol. 31 / June 2003, S. 193-261
- Burawoy, Michael (2015): *Public Sociology. Öffentliche Soziologie gegen Marktfundamentalismus und globale Ungleichheit*. Weinheim und Basel.
- Dickens, Charles (2012 [1837ff.]): *Oliver Twist*. München.
- Esping-Andersen, Gøsta (1990): *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Princeton.
- Fairclough, Norman/Wodak, Ruth (1997): "Critical discourse analysis". In: Van Dijk, Teun A. (Hg.): *Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction. Vol. 2*. London, S. 258-284.
- Fraser, Nancy (2015): "Dreifachbewegung. Die politische Grammatik der Krise nach Karl Polanyi". In: Brie, Michael (2015), S. 100-115.
- Gill, Stephen (1995): "Theorising the interregnum: the double movement and global politics in the 1990s". In: Cox, Robert W. et al (Hg.): *International Political Economy: Understanding Global Disorder*. London, S. 65-99.
- Griesser, Markus (2012): "The Making of Hartz IV. Ein Beitrag zur Erklärung eines radikalen Politikwandels". In: Kubicek, Bettina/Marlene Miglbauer/Johanna Muckenhuber/Claudia Schwarz (Hg.): *Arbeitswelten im Wandel*. Wien, S. 101-124.
- Harvey, David (2007): *Kleine Geschichte des Neoliberalismus*. Zürich.
- Hassel, Anke/Schiller, Christof (2010): *Der Fall Hartz IV. Wie es zur Agenda 2010 kam und wie es weitergeht*. Frankfurt/New York.
- Jäger, Siegfried (2012): *Kritische Diskursanalyse. Eine Einführung*. Münster.
- Jessop, Bob (2002): *The Future of the Capitalist State*. Cambridge/Malden.

- Jessop, Bob (2007): *Kapitalismus, Regulation, Staat. Ausgewählte Schriften*. Hamburg.
- Lessenich, Stephan (1998): "Relations matter: De-Kommodifizierung als Verteilungsproblem". In: Ders./Ostner, Ilona (1998) (Hg.), S. 91-108.
- Lessenich, Stephan/Ostner, Ilona (Hg.) (1998): *Welten des Wohlfahrtskapitalismus*. Frankfurt/M.
- Marx, Karl (1962 [1867]): *Das Kapital. Kritik der politischen Ökonomie*. 1. Band, MEW 23. Berlin.
- Offe, Claus/Lenhardt, Gero (2006 [1977]): "Staatstheorie und Sozialpolitik. Funktionen und Innovationsprozesse der Sozialpolitik". In: Offe, Claus: *Strukturprobleme des kapitalistischen Staates*. Veränderte Neuausgabe. Frankfurt/New York, S. 153-180.
- Peck, Jamie (2001): *Workfare States*. New York/London.
- Polanyi, Karl (2001 [1944]): *The Great Transformation. The political and economic origins of our time. Second Edition*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Pühringer, Stephan/Griesser, Markus (2016): *Has economics returned to being the "dismal science"? The changing role of economic thought in German labour market reforms*. ICAE Working Paper Series No. 49.
- Röttger, Bernd (1997): *Neoliberale Globalisierung und eurokapitalistische Regulation. Die politische Konstitution des Marktes*. Münster.
- Schmid, Günther/Oschmiansky, Frank (2006): "Arbeitsmarktpolitik und Arbeitslosenversicherung". In: Hockerts, Hans Günter (Hg.): *Geschichte der Sozialpolitik in Deutschland seit 1945. Band 5: 1966-1974*. Baden-Baden, S. 333-379.
- Silver, Beverly J. (2005 [2003]): *Forces of Labor. Arbeiterbewegungen und Globalisierung seit 1870*. Berlin/Hamburg.
- Townsend, Joseph (2011 [1786]): *Über die Armengesetze. Streitschrift eines Menschenfreundes*. Frankfurt/M.
- Vobruba, Georg (1983): *Politik mit dem Wohlfahrtsstaat*. Frankfurt/M.