Creating a pluralist paradigm: An application to the minimum wage debate

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Abstract

The paper offers a pluralist route along which different theoretical approaches can be integrated into a common framework. It proposes to use causal mapping and combine it with a micro-meso-macro architecture to get well-structured descriptions of different economic theories and to provide a good foundation for integrating these theories. In order to illustrate this point and to shed some new light on a contested economic issue, the paper applies this strategy to the minimum wage debate. It follows from the analysis that from a theoretical viewpoint, the effect of the minimum wage on employment is indeed ambiguous, which is perfectly in line with the existing empirical evidence.

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“A pluralist explanation may be indefinite, lacking elegance and refinement. But it is better to be approximately and inexactely right than to be perfectly and precisely wrong.”

Richard A. Lester (1953, 199)

1 Introduction

The domination of economics by a neoclassical mainstream has left other schools of economic thought increasingly marginalized. This state is problematic when we agree with Kurt W. Rothschild (1999, 5) that “plurality in economic and in social sciences in general is not only a obvious fact but also a necessary and desirable phenomenon in a very complex and continually changing subject.” If this plurality is denied or ignored, it undermines the general quality of analysis, since (Ibid., 5) “[d]epending on circumstances and the problem to be tackled, different approaches, or a combination of them, have to be used in order to be able to get nearer to the far-away truth.” While the idea, that a plurality of paradigms is required within economics, receives great support outside of the mainstream, there seems to be less of a consensus on how such a state should look like.

In this context, Kapeller and Dobusch (2012) have recently proposed in this journal three types of how to understand pluralism in economics: According to them, ‘selfish pluralism’ takes place when scholars think of their preferred paradigm as superior to other schools of thought, but support calls for pluralism because it helps the survival of their paradigm. Another version would be so-called ‘disinterested pluralism’, which means that scholars show more tolerance for different theoretical and analytical approaches, but shy away from applying these concepts or engage in interdisciplinary discussion. The key difference between those two is that the latter would be compatible with a coexistence of different paradigms in the long run, while the former would not. Eventually, the authors propose a third, superior type of pluralism, called ‘interested pluralism’. This form of pluralism requires that scholars actively engage across different schools of thought and are able to choose from a broad set of theories and methods without being limited by a
certain paradigm.

While the latter understanding of pluralism is surely demanding, it also seems very promising. Kapeller and Dobusch (lbid., 1054) suggest that a “pluralist paradigm” based on such an understanding “could help synthesize the ‘solved puzzles’ of different economic traditions in a single corpus – and such a competitor to neoclassical economics could build on a greater potential for empirical explanation than any strand of dissenting thought could come up with in isolation.” It is worth mentioning that such a pluralist paradigm would of course also include neoclassical economics, though its role would of course have to be significantly reduced.1

Once we subscribe to the idea of a pluralist paradigm, the practical question becomes one of operationalization. Here the researcher will often face the obstacle that different schools use different methods (formal models, econometric evidence, simulations, case studies etc.). Coming up with a framework for the synthesis is therefore not straightforward: Integrating them within one mathematical framework can be a difficult task, since formal models originating from different schools usually start from very different axiomatic and methodological foundations. Hence trying to integrate them might create logical inconsistencies on the way, while integrating non-formalized theories into such a framework would almost surely involve sacrificing part of their content.

Therefore, a better way to move forward might be to use verbal exposition as a preferred tool. This way the researcher can avoid to overly simplify certain theories and can retain a pragmatic stance on differences in axiomatic foundations. A potential shortcoming of verbal exposition is however that it may lack the precise structure that can be provided by a formal model. This paper argues that such potential disadvantage can be overcome by representing economic theories in terms of causal maps and by embedding

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1A pluralist paradigm is not necessarily ‘antineoclassical’. On the reason for including neoclassical economics see Rothschild (1989, 5; italics in original): “One may very well regard neoclassical economics as an interesting and useful partial theory as long as it is clearly restricted to its original research program: the study of the workings of a market economy with (in principle) flexible prices in a relatively simple and stable setting. In this respect the theory with its numerous modifications and developments can throw considerable light on the intricacies of such a system. The point here is that this theory with its strict axioms adapted to its specific research subject is hardly capable to deal with the diverse and complicated questions which turn up when we want to give more weight to the neglected political and sociological elements.”
these causal maps within a micro-meso-macro structure. In order to illustrate this point, the paper applies this method to the topic of the minimum wage in economics.

2 Causal maps and the micro-meso-macro architecture

In order to integrate economic theories that originate from different schools of thought, this paper proposes to focus on the causalities assumed by the respective models and represent them within causal maps. Causal mapping is a popular technique in the field of management studies, where interview data is turned into causal maps in order to reveal common patterns of entrepreneurial intentions (see e.g. Jenkins and Johnson, 1997). Within economics, Margolis (2017) has recently proposed to use such graphs to represent econometric models. He shows how using causal maps makes it easier to spot contradictions in identification strategies. While Margolis illustrates how graphical representations can contribute to a pluralist paradigm by testing conflicting hypothesis, I will argue that they can also be used to provide a platform for the integration of different theories.

Causal maps are a convenient tool for reducing complex content down to its essentials. In order to apply them to the complex matter of economic theories however, the paper proposes to augment them with a micro-meso-macro structure. Micro-meso-macro frameworks have initially been proposed by evolutionary economists in order to analyze evolutionary economic dynamics. Here the meso-level contains existing institutions, whereas the micro-level refers to the individual carriers of these institutions and the macro-level represents their aggregation (see Dopfer et al. 2004, Dopfer 2012, Elsner 2007). The emphasis within mainstream economics on the necessity of ‘microfoundations’, i.e. that macroeconomic phenomena be derived from individual behavior, has led to the prevalence of bottom-up explanations (King 2008). In contrast, many heterodox economists have argued that causality is not only a bottom-up, but also a top-down phenomenon (Dopfer et al. 2004, Lee 2011, King 2012). In order to reflect that within our framework,
causality is allowed to take place bottom-up, bottom-down as well as within levels (see Bunge 1996, Kapeller and Schütz 2013, Gräbner and Kapeller 2017).

The next section applies this method to the minimum wage discourse. This serves two purposes: On the one hand it illustrates how such a pluralist research agenda could look like, while on the other hand it sheds a better light into one of the most contested issues within economics.

3 An application to existing minimum wage theories

Not many subjects seem to be able to provoke such intense academic debate within economics like the minimum wage does. While some regard it as an appropriate tool to protect those who struggle to protect themselves, others insist that it harms exactly those it wants to help by taking away their jobs. While some have attributed the intensity of the debate to its political significance, others claim that it is due to the potential implications it holds for neoclassical economic theory: If higher wages do not lead to lower employment, this would be at odds with the core economic principles that the vast majority of mainstream economic models are built on nowadays (Leonard 2000, Kaufman 2010).

On a theoretical level the mainstream debate in economics has more or less been narrowed down to a controversy about whether the so-called ‘competitive’ or the ‘monopsonistic’ labor market view is more accurate (Dube et al. 2007; Neumark and Wascher 2007; Kaufman 2010). While the former represents the standard neoclassical view, the latter allows to explain the – to some at least – more counter-intuitive result of positive or zero employment effects within the narrow boundaries of neoclassical theory. While the latter does so by changing one key assumption (i.e. existence of market power by firms), it derives its legitimacy from the empirical part of the dispute: While some studies find evidence for negative employment effects, others find insignificant or slightly positive effects of the minimum wage on employment.\(^2\) It is therefore not surprising that meta-studies conclude that once publication bias is controlled for, the employment effect across

\(^2\)For a review of the literature see Giuliano (2013).
studies is close to zero (see Belman and Wolfson 2014; De Linde et al. 2014; Doucouliagos and Stanley 2009). Due to the narrow state of the theoretical debate, it also does not surprise that studies that find negative results interpret them as evidence for the validity of the competitive labor market view (e.g. Neumark and Wascher 2007), while those who find zero or positive results attribute it to the validity of the monopsonistic labor market view (e.g. Card and Krueger 1995; Giuliano 2013). Reducing the mainstream theoretical debate to a struggle between the competitive and the monopsonistic labor market view of course represents an unjustified simplification that omits post-Keynesian, institutionalist and evolutionary concepts that also shed some important light on the minimum wage issue.

The fact that the impact of the minimum wage is theoretically as well as empirically contested makes it an ideal candidate for pluralist economic analysis. In what follows we will discuss each of the existing theories by using the method described in the previous section.

3.1 The neoclassical standard model of the firm

We start with what can easily be called the most influential theoretical approach concerning the general minimum wage debate – the neoclassical model of the firm. Its textbook version is usually the first – and often also the last – model along which students are taught to think about the minimum wage. Accordingly it also has an enormous weight in public discussions. It exists in several versions, which differ from each other in the type of product market (competitive vs. monopolistic) and substitution possibilities between capital, high skilled and low skilled labor assumed.

3.1.1 Competitive and monopolistic firms

The model takes the single firm as its point of departure. This firm can either operate on a competitive or a monopolistic market. In the first case, the firm is assumed to be small and not to have any kind of market power. This means that the firm is able to sell

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3Hirsch et al. (2015), who draw on an institutionalist framework, recently provided a notable exception.

4For a more detailed discussion see e.g. Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2013) and Varian (2010).
any amount of its products as long as it charges the prevailing market price. Since it is small, its supply will not affect the market price and since it does not have any market power, charging above the market price would leave it unable to sell its products. In the second case the firm is assumed to have some kind of market power. On the one hand this can be the case when the firm has a significant market share, which means that a change in its supply of products has an effect on the market price. On the other hand it could mean that the firm’s products have some kind of unique feature which give them a competitive edge and allows the firm some autonomy in setting its prices.

In both cases it is assumed that the firm can hire any amount of workers as long as it pays the market wage, where it is assumed that the individual firm takes the market wage as given, i.e. the firm does not have the market power to influence this wage rate. The latter is a crucial assumption, since it distinguishes the current approach from the model of the monopsonistic labor market, which arrives at different conclusions regarding the employment effect of the minimum wage (see below).

Within this context it is assumed that the capital stock is given and cannot be changed (changing it would require a longer time period, see the long run below) and that the marginal product of labor is declining (i.e. the additional output that can be gained by adding an additional worker to a machine or another piece of capital is declining). Firm management is assumed to constantly optimize in order to maximize profits. The latter is obtained at the point where the cost for employing an additional unit of labor (the marginal cost of labor, MCL) is equal to the additional revenues related to hiring this unit of labor (the marginal revenue product of labor, MRPL).

Let us now illustrate these two versions of the neoclassical model by using the representation described in the previous section: Figure 1 shows the impact of the minimum wage according to the model of the competitive firm. The minimum wage represents an institution and is therefore located at the meso-level. Once it is raised (indicated by the upward-pointing arrow inside the box), it directly raises the real market wage at the

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5For the competitive firm the marginal revenue product of capital (MRPC) is equal to the marginal product of labor multiplied by the price that the firm receives on the market. In case of the monoplistic firm one has to additionally factor in the drop in the market price that follows from increasing the market supply by the respective amount.
micro-level. The resulting positive correlation between those two is also indicated by the ‘+’ next to the arrow representing the causal link. The rise in the market wage leads to a rise in the MCL (i.e. how much it would cost to higher an additional unit of labor or, vice versa, by how much costs would decline if the firm got rid of one unit of labor). With the MCL higher than before (suddenly exceeding the MRPL, since profit maximization meant that they were initially equal to each other), the firm reacts by reducing employment (the negative correlation indicated by the ‘-’ next to the arrow linking those two). Reducing employment increases the MRPL, hence employment continues to fall until the MRPL has risen sufficiently (at the end being equal to the MCL again). The MRPL therefore has a positive impact on employment. With employment being reduced, output declines, which ends up in reduced sales.

[Figure 1 should be put somewhere here]

The model of the monopolistic firm looks pretty similar, except for the fact that due to the firm’s market power, the fall in output increases the market price, which has positive influence on the MRPL and real revenue.\(^6\)

[Figure 2 should be put somewhere here]

The conclusion drawn from this standard neoclassical model is that a rise in the minimum wage leads to (since all firms are assumed to behave similarly) a fall in employment and, depending on the structure of the market, maybe a rise in prices. Crucial assumptions behind this result are that firms always maximize profits and that the MRPL rises as employment falls. Both of them will be challenged when we come to the institutionalist model of the firm.

3.1.2 The long run

In the short run the neoclassical model assumes that the firm is unable to change the stock of capital and therefore has to take it as given. This assumption is justified by

\(^6\)The net effect on revenue nevertheless has to be negative, otherwise the profit maximizing firm would have already reduced output independently of the rise in the minimum wage.
reference to the fact that installing additional capital takes some time. In the long run, however, the capital stock is variable. It follows that in the long run the firm gains additional flexibility in dealing with the minimum wage as it can substitute capital for labor.\footnote{See again e.g. Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2013) or Varian (2010).}

The respective causal map is displayed in figure 3. Here a rise in the real market wage implies that the relative cost of using capital as opposed to labor has declined. Firms react to it by using more capital instead of labor. While decisions to acquire additional capital can be made in the short run, its effects only become active in the long run, since it takes time to make this change to the production structure. These long run relationships are represented by dashed arrows within the causal map. Once the capital is acquired and installed, it causes a reduction in employment. Just like before, reduced employment goes along with a reduction of output, though this time this is partly compensated by the additional contribution of capital.\footnote{The net change in output must be negative, since the total marginal cost of production has increased. If this was not the case, it would have already been optimal for the firm to pay higher wages and employ more capital prior to the rise in the minimum wage.} We omit the impact on sales and revenue (which is the same as before) for reasons of exposition.

\textbf{[Figure 3 should be put somewhere here]}

Concluding, the long run version of the neoclassical model predicts a fall in employment accompanied by an increasing capital intensity of the production process. A crucial assumption behind this result is that capital is readily available. Once we come to the post-keynesian contributions we will see how it can change the result when we take into account that these units of capital (machines etc.) have to be produced actually.

\subsection*{3.1.3 Skill substitution and relative wage considerations}

Furthermore it has been suggested that the minimum wage leads to substitution not only between labor and capital, but also between different kinds of labor (e.g. Gramlich 1976). More precisely, workers whose wages increased due to the minimum wage might be substituted with workers whose skill sets allow them to earn wages above the minimum
wage. In the literature the latter are often called ‘high skilled’ workers, whereas the former are referred to as ‘low skilled’. If these two types of workers are imperfect substitutes, employment of low skilled workers will decrease, while employment of high skilled workers will increase (see Card and Krueger 1995, Ch. 11). Assuming that the productivity of high-skilled workers exceeds the productivity of low-skilled workers, fewer workers will be needed in total. Substitution will also go along with rising wages of high skilled workers as the demand for the service of the latter increases. Furthermore the wages of workers above the minimum wages may also increase because of relative wage concerns voiced in wage negotiations (e.g. Gramlich 1976).

Let us again illustrate that with a causal map (figure 4), where we distinguish between the group of ‘low wage workers’ and the remaining group of ‘other workers’ (the latter earning above the minimum wage): The minimum wage increases the real market wage of low wage workers, which not only increases the marginal cost of labor, but also raises the wage of low wage workers relative to the other workers. The firm reacts to it by reducing the proportion of low wage workers in their workforce by replacing them with other workers. Since those other workers are assumed to possess superior skills, the firm needs less workers in total, leading to a reduction in employment. However, wages of those other workers are also expected to increase. First, if firms want to hire more of the other workers, it will increase their wage demands. Second, their wages may also go up directly as a reaction to the initial wage increase of low wage workers (e.g. fairness concerns). Higher wage demands will increase their market wages and in turn reduce the relative wage of low wage workers compared to other workers. Depending on the size of this reaction, the proportion of low wage workers might in the end also remain unchanged (indicated by the ‘−’ next to the ↑). The rest is similar to before: Reducing the units of labor employed in production reduces output and increases the MRPL.

[Figure 4 should be put somewhere here]

In sum, the model predicts that the market wages of both group of workers go up, which is accompanied by a fall in employment that is more likely to affect low skilled workers.
3.2 The neoclassical model of the monopsonistic labor market and efficiency wage theory

Second in attention to the model of the competitive/monopolistic firm – though by quite a significant margin – stands the neoclassical model of the monopsonistic labor market. Whenever students are introduced to the possibility of minimum wages having a positive effect on employment, the topic is usually conveyed in terms of the monopsonistic model. Correspondingly, it is this model that researchers usually reference when they find zero or positive employment effects of the minimum wage. The textbook version of the model can be described as follows: The previous models assumed that the individual firm can hire any amount of workers it needs as long as it offers the prevailing market wage. This followed from the initial assumption that the individual firm’s labor demand is very small compared to the total size of the labor market. The current model drops this assumption and assumes instead that in order to attract additional workers, the individual firm has to increase the wage that it used to offer previously. Moreover, it is assumed that offering new entrants a higher wage means that the wages being paid to the previously hired workers have to be adjusted to that higher level. In such a setting, the total cost related to hiring an additional unit of labor (MCL) cannot be reduced to the wage that has to be paid to that additional worker, since one has to add the wage increase that consequently has to be given to all the previously hired workers. When taking that into account, a firm could abstain from hiring additional workers even if their wage demands fall below the MRPL that they would bring to the firm. In this setting a situation could arise in which the introduction of a minimum wage reduces the marginal cost related to hiring an additional worker, when the firm has to pay their other workers the higher wage anyway, so hiring an additional worker at a higher wage no longer has an effect on the

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9See again e.g. Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2013) or Varian (2010).
10This follows logically from the axiomatic structure of the model: As soon as one firm pays above the previously existing market wage, the remaining firms would have to follow, otherwise they would lose some of their workers, since some would want to join competing firms. If all firms switched to paying higher wages, the firm that increased its wage offer in the first place would also have to offer their previously hired employees that higher wage. Another, less technical, justification that one could think of would be that firms fear that not granting that higher wage to their other employees would raise severe fairness concerns within the workforce.
remaining wage bill.\textsuperscript{11}

We can illustrate this concept in the familiar environment (figure 5): Just like before, the minimum wage raises the real market wage, which has a positive impact on the MCL. However, this time there is also a counteracting direct influence from the minimum wage on the MCL. This link exists because the minimum wage raises the wages of those already employed and therefore reduces the increase in wages that would have to be given to them if the firm decided to hire an additional worker. Depending on the particular situation, the overall impact on the MCL can be positive or negative. If the MCL rises, we get the result from the competitive model. If it falls, however, employment and output will increase, while the MRPL will subsequently decrease.

[Figure 5 should be put somewhere here]

Furthermore, monopsony theory can be complemented by efficiency wage theory. The latter assumes that workers have an incentive to provide lesser effort if the probability of detection or the implicit cost of losing a job is small enough. In this context, a higher wage would decrease the incentive for workers to display this kind of shirking behavior, since in case of being detected their loss (a well-paid job) would be higher.\textsuperscript{12} Furthermore it is assumed that the probability of detection decreases with the size of the (non-supervisory) workforce, since a larger workforce is harder to monitor for the manager. Hiring an additional worker would decrease the probability for the individual worker of being detected while shirking. If the firm wants to avoid the surge of shirking behavior, it would have to offer a higher wage rate. Therefore, similar to before, the firm could abstain from hiring that additional worker if it takes the indirect costs into account.\textsuperscript{13}

Efficiency wage theory establishes an additional link between the market wage and

\textsuperscript{11}See e.g. Card and Krueger (1995, Ch. 11) or Varian (2010, Ch. 26). The original concept goes back to Robinson (1933).
\textsuperscript{12}In this model the worker would not be able to find immediate employment elsewhere, since it follows from the model of the competitive firm that if firms pay these higher wages, some level of unemployment would emerge as the supply of labor would exceed the demand (see e.g. Pindyck and Rubinfeld 2013, Ch. 17).
\textsuperscript{13}See Card and Krueger (1995, Ch. 11), Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2013, Ch. 17) and Rebitzer and Taylor (1991).
the MRPL (see figure 6): While the rise in the market wage due to the minimum wage still has the familiar effect on the MCL, it now also has a positive direct impact on the MRPL (because it leads to a rise in worker effort). Depending on which of those two effects dominates, employment might either increase or decrease – a situation similar to the monopsonistic model.

[Figure 6 should be put somewhere here]

We can conclude that following monopsony and efficiency wage theory, the minimum wage could increase employment if either the labor market can be described as a monopsony or wages have a strong effect on worker performance.

3.3 The institutionalist theory of the firm and evolutionary dynamics

The next two subsections discuss approaches that are much less represented in the academic and public debate. These are the institutionalist, the evolutionary and the post-Keynesian (see next section) view on the minimum wage. Institutionalist economists have pointed out many of the features discussed in the preceding analysis, though without placing them in the strict formal environment as neoclassical economists have done. These include i.a. market power (see the monopolistic firm), inequality of bargaining power (see the monopsonistic firm) and the relation between worker remuneration and worker motivation (see efficiency wages).\textsuperscript{14} For the sake of the analysis, however, these are left out here in order to limit the discussion to those features that have not been part of the analysis yet.

Institutionalist economic thought does not provide one single theory of the minimum wage, but rather a set of observations of how firms react to it (or “channels of adjustment” as Hirsch et al. [2015] have called them).\textsuperscript{15} A key difference is that institutionalist

\textsuperscript{14}See e.g. Kaufman (2010).

\textsuperscript{15}See the seminal paper of Lester (1946) as well as Kaufman (2010) and Hirsch et al. (2015). Lester (1946) is particularly interesting, as this article started an extensive discussion in the American Economic Review immediately upon publication (see Machlup 1946, 1947; Stigler 1946, 1947; Lester 1947; for a summary see Prasch 2007). The resulting controversy gives interesting insights into the nature of both neoclassical and institutionalist theory.
economics does not treat managers as agents who maximize profits at any time. Instead it emphasizes that managers are constrained by time and cognitive capacity. Moreover, it acknowledges that they are usually subject to more than one goal at a time (e.g. short term vs. long term profits, firm growth, long term survival of the firm, customer satisfaction, employee satisfaction, personal advancement etc.). In such an environment, institutionalist economists have argued that managers can be better described as ‘satisficers’ rather than optimizers. This has widespread implications for how managers are supposed to react to a higher minimum wage. As Hirsch et al. (2015, 231) put it with reference to survey results: “[M]anagers are overloaded with daily operation issues and work long weekly hours (often 50-55) and, hence, cannot devote the time to actively address important but longer-run or secondary operational issues. [...] Second, a principle-agent problem is present to the extent that owners cannot fully monitor salaried managers who may therefore satisfice rather than fully cost minimize.” Under these circumstances “[a] [minimum wage] hike thus acts as a catalyst or shock that forces managers to step out of the daily routine and think about where extra savings can occur.” In other words, since managers do neither have the time nor the incentive to constantly optimize, a sudden shock to profits (like a minimum wage) leads to a reassessment of the production process, at the end of which they often find some possibility to compensate for the cost increase.

It follows from these observations that institutionist theory is very skeptical about the neoclassical concept of employment being determined by marginal cost and revenue and rather sees actual and expected sales as predominant determinants. We look at the determinants of the latter in more detail once we come to the post-keynesian view in the next section.

Moreover, institutionalist economic thought challenges the idea that the marginal

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16 See on this also Penrose (1995).
17 The term satisfizing goes back to Herbert Simon (1955, 1956) and is a combination of the words “satisfy” and “suffice”. It basically states that in a complex environment people stop searching for a solution as soon as they find one that fulfills some threshold aspirations.
18 See on this e.g. Lester (1947, 138): “My position is that variations in the total volume of employment in a modern manufacturing plant already constructed are primarily the result of actual and anticipated changes in the volume of sales or orders for the products of the plant and that employers, for such reasons as those I gave, do not think or act in the labor market in terms of equating marginal net revenue productivity and marginal labor cost.”
revenue product of labor is declining as the number of workers increases. See on this e.g. Lester (1947, 138): “[E]mployers generally seem to believe that unit variable cost (and, judging from numerous interviews, particularly unit labor cost) increases significantly as the scale of operations of a plant declines from 100 per cent of plant capacity.”19 Taking additionally into account that a firm usually has to cover substantial (non-labor related) fixed costs, reducing output by reducing the amount of employed workers just would not make sense unless wages have increased to such a level that the contribution margin to cover these fixed costs has become negative.20

Besides these institutionalist insights into the nature of firms, a complete picture of the minimum wage should also take into account the evolutionary nature of the labor-saving process: While the neoclassical economic approach assumes that the technology which can be used to substitute labor in the production process is already available, evolutionary economists would argue that firms attempting to save labor in the production process will not always be able to draw on pre-existing technical solutions. Instead, some will find it necessary to look for tailor-made solutions. If this process succeeds, it will not only add to the demand for goods at the macro-level (we will come to this point once we discuss the post-keynesian perspective), but will also lead to the origination of an innovative technology that adds to the realm of technological possibilities at the meso-level. As a consequence, other firms might also adopt that new technology, leading to a further rise in labor-substituting capital at the micro-level until it has become the new production standard. These phases in turn correspond to the standard trajectories of economic evolution (origination, adoption, retention) (Schumpeter 1934[1987]).21

We can take a look at these implications in figure 7: As just mentioned, we add to the framework that attempts to substitute capital for labor should be accompanied by the origination of new technologies. Therefore, in the long run increases in capital will add

19See also Blinder et al. (1999) who present survey evidence that the majority of firms claim that their marginal costs are declining as production increases.
20Note that without the neoclassical assumption of a falling MRPL, the latter would mean that the firm should end production all together, since any reduction in employment would not lead to an improvement of the MRPL and thus the contribution margin.
21For applications within a macroeconomic context see Dosi et al. (2010, 2017). See also Cassetti (2003) and Naastepad (2006) who argue from a post-keynesian perspective that higher wages promote technological progress by increasing aggregate investment into labor-saving capital.
to the realm of technological possibilities at the meso level. Other firms are expected to follow suit, leading to a prolonged rise in capital accumulation at the micro level for this period of adaptation.

However, the most important difference to the figures discussed previously is that the impact of a higher minimum wage, and thus higher real wages, does not come through the MCL. Instead, higher real wages act through their impact on total real labor cost, which in turn has a direct negative effect on actual and expected profits. This shock to profits can trigger a number of adjustment strategies: One of the strategies with which managers react to a sudden drop in actual/expected profits consists of reducing real non-labor costs (e.g. looking for ways to save energy or to reduce waste). If successful, this has a positive influence on the profits of the individual firm. On the revenue side the most obvious strategy is to pass on these higher costs through higher prices. The latter is an attempt to raise revenues, but might come at the cost of reducing actual sales. In order to increase sales (a sensible strategy when the firm has to cover fixed costs), firms can also respond by increasing quality or sales effort. Whatever happens to sales determines the outcome on employment: less expected/actual sales will lead to less employment, less output and correspondingly a reduction in labor cost, whereas a rise in sales would be accompanied by more employment, higher output and a rise in labor cost.

This represents a key difference to the neoclassical models discussed before: the latter see the level of employment as the result of an interplay between the MCL and the MRPL. Due to its lack of importance to the institutionalist framework, the MCL is missing from the figure. In contrast the MRPL does feature in it, but only to highlight the difference in assumptions: whereas neoclassical economics assumes a negative causal effect of employment on the MRPL, institutionalists assume that it is positive (see the ‘+’ next to the linking arrow in figure 7, which stands in contrast to the ‘-’ in figures 1-6).

[Figure 7 should be put somewhere here]

This section highlighted the importance of actually observed behavioral patterns as well as the significance of actual and expected sales. The next section discusses the latter
aspect in more detail.

3.4 The post-keynesian perspective

Post-keynesian economic theory offers a macroeconomic perspective on the minimum wage. In general, institutionalist and post-keynesian theory show many overlaps and similarities. With respect to the subject at hand, both have in common that they see actual and anticipated sales as the main determinants of employment. The post-keynesian perspective complements this discussion by focusing explicitly on the macroeconomic determinants of these sales.

In the previous analysis, the neoclassical firm took the demand for goods as given and only worried about how much it should produce given the constraint of a decreasing MRPL. Give these assumptions, the neoclassical firm raised production until the MRPL reached zero. In contrast, post-keynesian analysis claims that aggregate demand is the ultimate constraint to how much a firm is willing to produce: firms produce the amount of goods they think they will be able to sell and that, under normal circumstances, this number is lower than the number they would like to sell. Moreover, post-keynesians (similar to institutionalists) argue that most firms face a constant or increasing MRPL (i.e. the MRPL is unaffected or increases as employment rises; see e.g. Lavoie 2014) until the plant reaches full capacity, which rules out the possibility of the MRPL being an effective constraint: a firm facing an increasing MRPL would want to produce as many goods as possible given existing production capacities. Based on empirical evidence Post-Keynesians assume that firms usually operate below their full capacity.

With respect to the minimum wage the post-keynesian perspective focuses on the double character of wages, which consists of being a cost to production on the one hand, and a source for consumption demand on the other hand. Employment decisions are based

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22See Keynes (1936). For a contemporary assessment see Davidson (2007).

23Post-keynesian authors are e.g. usually quite sympathetic to the institutionalist view of the nature of the firm (see e.g. Lavoie 2014), while aggregate demand plays an important part in the institutionalist analysis of unemployment (see e.g. Kaufman 2010). Indeed Keynes himself had been very influenced by institutionalist economic thought (see Whalen 2008).

24See on this Lavoie (2014, 147) who sums up the previous points: “[F]irst, short-run average costs are generally decreasing; second, marginal costs, and hence average variable costs, are roughly constant up to full capacity; third, firms generally produce at levels where there are reserves of capacity.”
on actual and expected sales, which in turn depend on aggregate demand. Aggregate demand consists of the already mentioned demand for consumption goods and the demand for capital goods. The latter depends on expected future profits and the ‘animal spirits’ of the entrepreneurs (Keynes 1936). On the one hand, a rise in the minimum wage can depress these expectations by increasing labor cost. On the other hand the minimum wage could also increase profit expectations, as higher wages would increase labor income and increase expected sales. If the latter effect is significant, firms might even increase production and employment levels.

According to Keynes, these investment decisions however also depend on meso-level factors such as the political and social atmosphere: The introduction of a minimum wage could influence this atmosphere in a manner which could be congenial (e.g. if business perceives it as a necessary measure to preserve social cohesion and consumer demand) or detrimental (e.g. if business perceives it as part of an agenda against the rich) to investment.

This is illustrated in figure 8: As the minimum wage drives up the real market wage, labor cost increases at the firm level, thereby influencing expected profits negatively. If firms only reacted to this particular information, they would probably raise prices in an effort to cover some of the cost increase and reduce investment. However, the inclusion of aggregate demand provides a further dimension to the analysis: Higher wages also mean that employed workers will earn more than before and aggregate labor income would increase, implying more demand for consumption goods. However, while rising labor incomes would increase purchasing power on the aggregate level, rising prices tend to do

25See on this Keynes (1936[1997], 162): “It is safe to say that enterprise which depends on hopes stretching into the future benefits the community as a whole. But individual initiative will only be adequate when reasonable calculation is supplemented and supported by animal spirits, so that the thought of ultimate loss [...] is put aside as a healthy man puts aside the expectation of death. [...]This means, unfortunately, [...] that economic prosperity is excessively dependent on a political and social atmosphere which is congenial to the average business man. If the fear of a Labour Government or a New Deal depresses enterprise, this need not be the result either of a reasonable calculation or of a plot with political intent; – it is the mere consequence of upsetting the delicate balance of spontaneous optimism. In estimating the prospects of investment, we must have regard, therefore, to the nerves and hysteria and even the digestions and reactions to the weather of those upon whose spontaneous activity it largely depends.” On the role of expectations with regard to the impact of changes in the wage rate see also chapter 19 in Keynes (1936[1997]).

26See again the quote in the previous footnote.
the opposite: here individual firm decisions to increase prices add up to the aggregate price level, which in turn negatively affects the real market wage. As long as the increase in prices does not fully match the rise in labor cost however, aggregate demand for goods would go up as a result.

The second component of aggregate demand is summarized under non-labor cost in figure 8. Its main component here is production capital: any additional investment into production capital would not only have an impact on profits, but would directly contribute to the aggregate demand for goods. This means that whenever the rise in the demand for consumption goods is not offset by an equal decline in investment, sales would increase. On the one hand such a rise in sales would result in higher employment and higher output. Higher employment simultaneously means higher labor cost, with the latter being again a source of aggregate income (therefore feeding its way back into the system) and a burden to profits at the same time. On the other hand higher sales result in higher revenues, which in turn affect profits positively. Due to these counteracting influences, the total impact on profits can be positive or negative. In the end, whatever happens to actual profits influences investment (i.e. the demand for capital goods), which has the familiar repercussion effects through aggregate demand.

Moreover, the minimum wage can exhibit a meso-level effect by influencing the political and social atmosphere. The direction of this impact depends on the wider circumstances, but exerts an influence on employment through its impact on profit expectations. Whatever happens to profit expectations on the micro-level of course also feeds back to the meso-level as individual entrepreneurs’ expectations contribute in shaping collective sentiments.

Finally, we add that some of the elements introduced in the previous section (quality and sales effort, real non-labor cost) exert different impacts when seen from such a post-keynesian perspective: from a post-keynesian perspective, quality and sales effort as well as changes in real non-labor cost have an effect on the aggregate demand for goods, just as real non-labor cost and real revenues are, by definition, also affected by changes in the aggregate price level.
Concluding, whether the positive or the negative effects prevail depends on the firms’ reactions in the short run: If the rise in expected labor cost causes a strong negative reaction (i.e. sharp increase in prices and large reductions in investment), the above mentioned positive effects on aggregate demand would be outweighed by negative ones and employment would decline. If on the other hand firms act reluctantly (i.e. not much change in investment behavior) or even optimistic (e.g. firms anticipating positive future effects on consumer spending), positive effects on employment would prevail.

4 Towards a pluralist understanding of the minimum wage debate

Having discussed these different approaches, we can integrate them to get the general picture. Figure 9 combines the information gathered in the previous section: It contains every box and every causal link included in figures 1-8. On the one hand figure 9 shows the large variety of variables one has to take into account if one really wants to adopt a pluralist perspective on the effects of the minimum wage. On the other hand it reveals interesting complementarities and contradictions between theories.

Let us take a closer look at it. Again it all starts with a change in the minimum wage.\(^{27}\) According to our previous discussion a rise in the minimum wage can have three direct effects: First of all it increases the real market wage of those workers earning a low wage. This can have a number of potential consequences: it can increase the MCL, reduce the cost of capital vs. labor, increase the relative cost of low wage workers vs. the other workers, increase the marginal revenue product of labor and increase the total cost of labor. Each one of these comes with its own consequences:

\(^{27}\)The arrows within the boxes have been dropped in this exposition, since in the general picture practically everything could either increase or decrease, which dramatically reduces the additional information that can be gained by adding these arrows.
employment (for some workers the cost of employing them suddenly exceeds the revenue expected from keeping them).

- Also according to neoclassical theory, a fall in the relative cost of capital vs. labor will lead to additional investment into capital, which allows the firm to reduce employment in the long run without sacrificing too much in terms of output.

- Similarly, the rise in the relative wage of low wage workers vs. other workers reduces the share of low wage workers, which reduces the number of employed workers, but also potentially increases the wage demands and the real market wages of the other workers. The consequences of the rise in these other market wages are similar to the rise in those lower wages.

- Neoclassical theory has it that a rise in the MRPL increases employment (additional revenue expected from hiring new workers suddenly exceeds the cost of employing them).

- The rise in total labor cost has a negative effect on actual and expected profits as well as a positive impact on aggregate labor income. The former triggers a couple of adjustment strategies at the firm level (institutionalist theory) and has a negative impact on capital formation (post-keynesian theory). The latter contributes positively to the aggregate demand for goods.

[Figure 9 should be put somewhere here]

The second direct effect of the minimum wage concerns the MCL, where according to neoclassical theory a rise in the minimum wage could actually reduce this marginal cost if we have monopsonistic firms: If firms fear that hiring an additional worker would drive up current wages, then the introduction of a minimum wage could mean that this threat ceases to exist, since under the minimum wage these wages have already gone up anyway. The declining marginal cost in turn as a positive impact on employment.

The third direct effect concerns the political and social atmosphere: According to the post-keynesian view, the latter has an impact on entrepreneurs’ profit expectations, which
subsequently influence their investment decisions. The precise impact can be positive or negative, depending on whether firms focus on the negatives (higher costs) or positives (creation of potential consumer demand). Moreover causality goes into both directions, as individual expectations at the micro-level shape the collective sentiment at the meso-level.

Whatever happens to actual/expected profits and capital accumulation comes along with further consequences: According to institutionalist theory, a fall in actual/expected profits can lead to a couple of coping strategies, which involves increasing prices, increasing quality or sales effort or reducing non-labor cost. While the former represent attempts to raise revenues (which can be important when the firm has to cover substantial fixed costs), the latter tackles the problem of reduced profits from the cost side. Each of these strategies has an impact on the macro-level: When firms raise prices, it raises the aggregate price level, which subsequently affects real wages and real labor cost (i.a. important for consumer demand), real profits and real non-labor cost. Attempts to raise sales have a positive impact on aggregate demand, while successful steps to reduce non-labor costs reduce the aggregate demand for goods. Capital is part of non-labor cost, so whatever happens to capital accumulation has an important impact on aggregate demand (see post-the keynesian perspective). Furthermore, in the long run the acquisition of new capital can lead to the origination of new technologies at the meso-level. When these technologies are subsequently adopted by competing firms, it leads to even more capital accumulation.

Finally, this kind of analysis also allows for spotting potential contradictions. One such case in figure 9 is the effect of employment on the MRPL, which can be positive or negative (indicated by the ‘-/+’): While neoclassical economics assumes a negative relationship (each additional worker contributes less than the worker hired before), institutionalists argue – based on empirical observation – in favor of a negative relationship (i.e. unit variable cost increasing as the scale of operation of a plant declines). This has rather interesting implications: In the former case it makes sense for the firm to react to a rise in the MCL by reducing employment and output, since doing so would increase
the MRPL (i.e. unit variable costs should decline). In the latter case such a marginal reduction of employment and output does not make sense: Lower employment would be associated with a lower MRPL and would therefore make the situation even worse for the firm. Therefore, the neoclassical story in figure 9 (MCL → employment → MRPL → employment) only makes sense when the effect of employment on the MRPL is negative, since otherwise the theory would contradict itself. Indeed, when the effect is positive, a firm would always want to produce at the highest possible scale, which in turn fits nicely to the institutionalist/post-keynesian story that employment is essentially determined by the amount of actual/expected sales (sales → employment): If firms could increase the MRPL by producing more (i.e. hiring more workers) but refrain from doing so, what is it that holds them back? The institutionalist/post-keynesian answer to that question would be that it is the amount of goods they expect being able to sell.

5 Conclusion

The discipline of economics usually offers multiple explanations for economic phenomena, where each of these explanations potentially captures important arguments. From this perspective, restricting the analysis to a narrow set of theoretical approaches will almost inevitably lead to premature conclusions. However, incorporating all relevant insights into one’s thinking can be quite difficult, since first of all one has to be aware of all of them, and secondly one has to be able to think of them in an integrated way. Especially the second one can be quite hard as different fragments of economic analysis can differ substantially in their degree of formal treatment and their axiomatic foundations.

The paper offers a pluralist route along which different theoretical approaches can be compared and integrated into a common framework. Causal mapping has the advantage that due to its straightforward nature, the essence of economic theories can be presented quite easily without imposing additional assumptions onto them. When this method is combined with a micro-meso-macro architecture, we get well-structured descriptions of theoretical economic processes.
The analysis exposes compatible as well as conflicting patterns amongst the theories. Whereas institutionalist and post-keynesian theories are very compatible with each other, neoclassical theories show more patterns of conflicting with respect to the rest. Here the analysis shows that this conflict boils down to the question whether employment is determined by (relative) marginal cost and revenue considerations, or by expected sales. It also exposes the various building blocks upon which these arguments are based on and how these elements are intersecting each other at times. Some of these intersections show how different theories could complement each other, while others reveal a direct conflict of hypotheses. An example for the former is capital accumulation, where the neoclassical theory of the firm would become more general if it took into account that adding to the capital stock means that some other firm has to produce that unit of capital (i.e. capital accumulation adds to aggregate demand) or that introducing such labor-saving capital can involve the origination of new technologies. Exemplary for the latter is the effect of a decline in employment on the marginal revenue product of labor, which is assumed to be positive (neoclassical theory) and negative (institutionalist theory).

In the end, the analysis shines considerable light into the theoretical debate, but falls short of solving the question of whether or not minimum wages reduce employment. However, this should not come as a surprise to anyone, since this is a simple reflection of the results gained in empirical studies. Ultimately, the integrated model provides an excellent justification for this mixed empirical evidence, since it indicates that in the end there are just so many counteracting channels through which the minimum wage can affect employment, that the idea that they roughly cancel each other out does not seem to be far off. In this sense our pluralist analysis provides a much more comprehensive answer than the mainstream focus on the “competitive” vs. “monopsonistic” labor market argument is able to provide.
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Figure 1: The neoclassical model of the competitive firm
Figure 2: The neoclassical model of the monopolistic firm
**Figure 3:** The neoclassical model of the competitive firm in the long run, with dashed arrows expressing long run effects

**Macro**

**Meso**

**Micro**
Figure 4: Skill substitution and relative wage considerations in the neoclassical model of the competitive firm

Macro

Meso

Micro

- real market wages (others)
- real market wage (low)
- marg. revenue product of labor
- wage demands (others)
- share of low wage workers
- wage of low wage vs. others
- marg. cost of labor
- employment
- output
Figure 5: The neoclassical model of the monopsonistic labor market
Figure 6: Neoclassical efficiency wage theory
Figure 7: The institutionalist theory of the firm and evolutionary dynamics
Figure 8: The post-keynesian perspective
Figure 9: A pluralist framework to assess the minimum wage – employment relationship