Opinion Statement ECJ-TF 4/2014 of the CFE on the decision of the European Court of Justice in Joined Cases C-39/13, C-40/13 and C-41/13, *SCA Group Holding BV et al*, on the requirements to form “fiscal unity”

Prepared by the ECJ Task Force of the CFE
Submitted to the European Court of Justice, the European Commission and the EU Council in December 2014

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This is an Opinion Statement prepared by the CFE ECJ Task Force on Joined Cases C-39/13, C-40/13 and C-41/13, SCA Group Holding BV et al, which were decided by the Second Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union on 12 June 2014.

I. Issues and Preliminary Questions

1. This Opinion Statement analyses the Court’s decision in Joined Cases C-39/13, C-40/13 and C-41/13, SCA Group Holding BV et al, of 12 June 2014, concerning the question whether the Netherlands violate the provisions on freedom of establishment if they refuse to form a “fiscal unity” (“fiscale eenheid”) between domestic companies in cases where (1) one or more intermediate companies are residents of another Member State (C-39/13 and C-41/13) or (2) the common parent company of two domestic sister companies is resident in another Member State (C-40/13). The Dutch “fiscal unity” treats separate entities as one taxable unit for corporate income tax purposes and hence enables, e.g., the full consolidation of profits and losses and disregarding of internal transactions, including reorganisations.

2. More specifically, SCA Group Holding BV et al addresses the impact of the freedom of establishment on tax consolidation between companies that are all located in the Netherlands where domestic law bars such consolidation because one or more of the “link companies” are located in another Member State. Despite the wider scope of the Dutch “fiscal unity” regime, SCA Group Holding BV et al also falls within the broader group of cases where the utilization of domestic losses is excluded because the resident loss-making company is held via a non-resident company. Such situations have already been at issue in the Court’s decisions in Papillon, Philips Electronics and most recently – Felixstowe Docks. Hence, the present case was not concerned with the utilization of the foreign losses of non-resident subsidiaries, which has been discussed by the Court in a second group of cases such as Marks & Spencer, Oy AA, X Holding and A Oy. Therefore, even if the same consolidation regime is concerned, e.g., the Dutch fiscal unity regime in X Holding on the one hand and the present case on the other, the EU law standards governing the use of foreign losses need to be distinguished from those governing the utilization of domestic losses.

3. With its extensive questions, the referring Gerechtshof te Amsterdam raised two broad issues under the Dutch fiscal unity regime, i.e., whether the rules on the freedom of establishment (Arts 49, 54 TFEU; ex-Arts 43, 48 EC) must be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State under which

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1 Members of the Task Force are: Paul Farmer, Alfredo Garcia Prats, Daniel Gutmann, Volker Heydt, Eric Kemmeren, Georg Kofler (Chair), Michael Lang, Franck Le Mentec, Pasquale Pistone, Albert Rädler, Stella Raventos-Calvo, Isabelle Richelle, Friedrich Roedler and Kelly Stricklin-Coutinho. Although the Opinion Statement has been drafted by the ECJ Task Force, its content does not necessarily reflect the position of all members of the group.

2 See Art 15(3)(c) of the Netherlands’ Law on Corporation Tax, requiring that (on each level of the group) “both taxable persons are established in the Netherlands”, subject to the exception that also a permanent establishment of a non-resident corporation may qualify (Art 15(4) of the Law on Corporation Tax).

3 Case C-418/07, Papillon, EU:C:2008:659.

4 Case C-18/11, Philips Electronics, EU:C:2012:532.

5 Case C-80/12, Felixstowe Dock and Railway Company et al, EU:C:2014:200.

6 Case C-446/03, Marks & Spencer, EU:C:2005:763.

7 Case C-231/05, Oy AA, EU:C:2007:439.

8 Case C-337/08, X Holding, EU:C:2010:89.

9 Case C-123/11, A Oy, EU:C:2013:84.


11 While the referring court framed its questions in light of Arts 43, 48 EC and AG Kokott did not deem it necessary to decide whether only those Articles or also Arts 49, 54 TFEU are applicable ratione temporis, since they have identical
a resident parent company can form a single tax entity with a resident sub-subsidiary where it holds that sub-subsidiary through one or more resident companies, but cannot where it holds that sub-subsidiary through non-resident companies which do not have a permanent establishment in that Member State (C-39/13 and C-41/13).

- treatment as a single tax entity is granted to a resident parent company which holds resident subsidiaries, but is precluded for resident sister companies the common parent company of which neither has its seat in that Member State nor has a permanent establishment there (C-40/13).

II. The Judgment of the Court

4. In its judgment of 12 June 2014, the Court (Second Chamber) held that the impossibility to form a fiscal unity under Dutch law between companies resident in the Netherlands due the existence of a “link” company in another Member State, i.e., either intermediate non-resident companies linking the Dutch parent and its Dutch sub-subsidiary or a non-resident parent company linking two Dutch sister companies, constitutes an unjustified restriction of the freedom of establishment. Advocate General Kokott had come to the same conclusion in her opinion of 27 February 2014, albeit based on a somewhat different reasoning. Given the Netherlands’ requirement of a 95% shareholding for the fiscal unity regime, there was also no doubt that the case had to be considered under the freedom of establishment (and not the free movement of capital).

5. First, the Court considered the situations where fiscal unity was denied because the “linking” intermediate subsidiary (and sub-subsidiary) is resident in another EU Member State (C-39/13 and C-41/13):

a) As for the existence of a restriction, the Court referred to X Holding and noted that the fiscal unity regime, which allows resident parent companies and their resident subsidiaries to be taxed as if they formed one and the same tax entity (“tax integration scheme”), provides a cash-flow advantage for the companies concerned, and that this scheme allows, in particular, the profits and losses of the companies constituting the tax entity to be consolidated at the level of the parent company and the transactions carried out within the group to remain neutral for tax purposes. Since the Dutch regime also applies to sub-subsidiaries and sub-sub-subsidiaries, as long as those intermediate subsidiaries are themselves resident or have a permanent establishment in the Netherlands, that legislation creates a difference in treatment since the ability to elect for the tax entity regime is dependent on whether the parent company holds its indirect stakes through a subsidiary established in the Netherlands or in...
another Member State.\textsuperscript{20} The Court also found it “irrelevant that, even in a purely internal situation, no parent company can form a tax entity with sub-subsidiaries without also including the intermediate subsidiary”, since a “Netherlands parent company which holds Netherlands sub-subsidiaries by means of a non-resident subsidiary cannot, in any case, form a tax entity with those sub-subsidiaries”, while, “by contrast, a Netherlands parent company which holds Netherlands sub-subsidiaries through a resident subsidiary still has the ability to elect to do so”\textsuperscript{21}.

b) Next, the Court considered the justification for the restriction, which (now) is a two-prong analysis: The difference in treatment is only compatible with the freedom of establishment, if it (1) either relates to situations which are not objectively comparable or (2) is justified by an overriding reason in the public interest.\textsuperscript{22} As for comparability, the Court noted that the objective comparability of situations must be assessed having regard to the aim pursued by the provisions at issue.\textsuperscript{23} In light of the aim of the Dutch fiscal unity regime (i.e., enabling the results of companies to be consolidated for tax purposes), the Court in turn found that purely internal situations and situations involving a non-resident “link” company are “objectively comparable to the extent that the benefit of the advantages of the tax entity regime is sought in both situations for the group formed by the parent company and the sub-subsidiaries”.\textsuperscript{24}

As for the justification by an overriding reason in the public interest, the Court did not address a Member State’s preservation of powers of taxation (with regard to symmetry between the right to tax profits and the right to deduct losses)\textsuperscript{25} and quickly rejected a justification on the ground of the risk of tax avoidance,\textsuperscript{26} but discussed at some length whether the Netherlands’ tax system is coherent with regard to the prevention of the double use of losses.\textsuperscript{27}

The “coherence justification” requires a direct link between the granting of the tax advantage concerned and the offsetting of that advantage by a particular tax,\textsuperscript{28} and indeed such direct link had been found by Court in \textit{Papillon}\textsuperscript{29} concerning the French tax integration regime. In that case the Court accepted a direct link between the tax advantage (i.e., possibility of transferring losses) and tax disadvantages (i.e., neutralisation of certain transactions between those companies), as the purpose of neutralising those intra-group transactions was to avoid the double use of losses at the level of resident companies falling under the tax integration regime, and thus preserve the coherence of that tax system.\textsuperscript{30} This was because of the opera-

\textsuperscript{20} Paras 23-24 of the judgment, referring to, by analogy, Case C-418/07, \textit{Papillon}, EU:C:2008:659, para. 22.

\textsuperscript{21} Para. 25 of the judgment.


\textsuperscript{23} Para. 28 of the judgment. See also, e.g., Case C-337/08, \textit{X Holding}, EU:C:2010:89, para. 22; Case C-18/11, \textit{Philips Electronics}, EU:C:2012:532, para. 17; Case C-80/12, \textit{Felixstowe Dock and Railway Company et al}, EU:C:2014:200, para. 25.

\textsuperscript{24} Paras 29-31 of the judgment; see also Case C-418/07, \textit{Papillon}, EU:C:2008:659, para. 29.

\textsuperscript{25} For a rejection of that argument where domestic losses are concerned, see Case C-18/11, \textit{Philips Electronics}, EU:C:2012:532, paras 25-26, and Case C-80/12, \textit{Felixstowe Dock and Railway Company et al}, EU:C:2014:200, para. 30.

\textsuperscript{26} See Para. 42 of the judgment, noting that “that ground does not constitute, by itself, an autonomous justification for a tax restriction on freedom of establishment if it is not relied on in conjunction with a specific objective of combatting wholly artificial arrangements which do not reflect economic reality and the purpose of which is to escape the tax normally due”, which is “[e]vidently, [...] not the objective of the restriction provided for in the tax entity regime”. For a similar analysis with regard to the UK regime see Case C-80/12, \textit{Felixstowe Dock and Railway Company et al}, EU:C:2014:200, paras. 31-34. For the Court’s case law on such a justification see generally, \textit{inter alia}, Case C-264/96, ICI, EU:C:1998:370, para. 26, and Case C-196/04, \textit{Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas}, EU:C:2006:544, para. 55. It might be noted, however, that the “abuse justification” might be acceptable if it is combined with the need to safeguard a balanced allocation of taxing powers between Member States, even where the domestic legislation is not specifically aimed at purely artificial arrangements; see, e.g., Case C-231/05, Oy AA, EU:C:2007:439, para. 63.

\textsuperscript{27} Paras 32-41 of the judgment.

\textsuperscript{28} Para. 33 of the judgment, referring to Case C-181/12, \textit{Welte}, EU:C:2013:662, para. 59.

\textsuperscript{29} Case C-418/07, \textit{Papillon}, EU:C:2008:659.

tion of the French regime: If the legislation at issue in Papillon had granted the benefit of tax integration between a French parent and its French sub-subsidiary where the intermediate company was not resident, it would have been possible for a loss suffered by a resident sub-subsidiary to be taken into account in the first instance with respect to the resident parent company (because of the tax integration), and in the second instance with respect to the non-resident intermediate subsidiary (because of a tax deductible write-off of the participation in the non-resident subsidiary as a result of the reduction of value stemming from the same losses on its shares in the sub-subsidiary or its claims against it).

In SCA Group Holding BV et al, however, the Court distinguished Papillon from the Netherlands’ system: Under the general Dutch participation exemption (“deelnemingsvrijstelling”) rule, the profits or losses resulting from the possession, acquisition or disposal of a holding are not taken into account when determining the taxable profit of a tax entity, so that a resident parent company can never take into account a loss linked to a holding in one of its subsidiaries, even where that subsidiary has its seat in another Member State. Therefore, so the Court continued, it is through this general exemption – and not specific provisions for the neutralisation of certain transactions, as in the system at issue in the case giving rise to the judgment in Papillon – that the Netherlands’ tax system seeks to prevent the double use of losses within a tax entity. And because the Dutch participation exemption rule is a general one and not limited to the fiscal unity, the Court found no direct link between the granting of the tax advantage linked to the formation of a tax entity and the offsetting of that advantage by a particular tax, so that, consequently, the restriction on freedom of establishment cannot be justified by the need to preserve the coherence of the tax system.

6. Second, the Court addressed the situation where fiscal unity was denied because the common parent of two resident sister companies was resident in another Member State (C-40/13):

a) With regard to the existence of a restriction, the Court pointed out that freedom of establishment aims to guarantee the benefit of national treatment in the host Member State, by prohibiting any discrimination based on the place in which companies have their seat. As the “fiscal unity” regime confers a “cash advantage on the group” by allowing, inter alia, the immediate set-off of losses between profit- and loss-making resident subsidiaries of a resident parent company, the Dutch rules create a difference in treatment by excluding from such advantage “parent companies which also own subsidiaries in the Netherlands but have their seat in another Member State and are without a permanent establishment in the Netherlands”. That disadvantage compared with purely domestic situations constitutes a restriction, which “is not called into question by the fact that the common parent company of the subsidiaries to be consolidated is situated at a higher level in the group’s chain of interests”.

b) The Court then turned to the justification for the restriction and first addressed the objection that the Dutch “fiscal unity” regime would “seeks to consolidate all of a group’s results with

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31 The Court refers to it as „holding exemption“ in paras 3, 37, 38 and 39 of the judgment.
32 That rule, which is established in Art 13 of the Law on Corporation Tax of 1969 applies to holdings greater than 5% of the capital, and hence covers all tax entities in the fiscal unity regime, since they require a holding of at least 95% of the capital; see para. 37 of the judgment.
33 See para. 39 of the judgment.
34 Paras 37-41 of the judgment.
35 See Para. 45 of the judgment, referring to Case C-374/04, Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation, EU:C:2006:773, para. 43, Case C-170/05, Denkavit Internationaal and Denkavit France, EU:C:2006:783, para. 22, and Case C-284/06, Burda, EU:C:2008:365, para. 77; see also, e.g., Case C-524/04, Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation, EU:C:2007:161, para. 37.
36 Para. 46 of the judgment.
37 Para. 47 of the judgment.
38 Para. 48 of the judgment, referring to Case C-418/07, Papillon, EU:C:2008:659, para. 32; see also, e.g., Case C-524/04, Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation, EU:C:2007:161, para. 61.
respect to the ultimate parent company, so that the position of a group the parent company of which has its seat in the Netherlands would not be comparable to that of a group the parent company of which has its seat in another Member State”, and rejected that analysis based on the objective of the “fiscal unity” regime, which allows the consolidation of the subsidiaries in the case of a group the parent of which is resident. Hence, the difference of treatment, as regards the possibility of fiscally integrating sister companies, is therefore not justified by an objective difference of situation. Nor is it justified by an overriding reason in the public interest: The Court not only rejected a justification based on the risk of tax avoidance, but also one based on the coherence of the tax system with regard to the prevention of the double use of losses, as it was not apparent “that the granting of the benefit of the tax entity to sister companies would break any direct link between that advantage and a particular tax”.

7. Hence, the ECJ ruled as follows:

“1. In Cases C-39/13 and C-41/13, Articles 49 TFEU and 54 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State under which a resident parent company can form a single tax entity with a resident sub-subsidiary where it holds that sub-subsidiary through one or more resident companies, but cannot where it holds that sub-subsidiary through non-resident companies which do not have a permanent establishment in that Member State.

2. In Case C-40/13, Articles 49 TFEU and 54 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State under which treatment as a single tax entity is granted to a resident parent company which holds resident subsidiaries, but is precluded for resident sister companies the common parent company of which neither has its seat in that Member State nor has a permanent establishment there.”

III. Comments

8. Consistent Case-Law. The Court’s result in SCA Group Holding BV et al is in line with previous case law on the use of domestic losses in group taxation regimes: In Papillon, the Court objected to the exclusion of a domestic sub-subsidiary from the French “tax integration” regime where the intermediate subsidiary is established in another Member State. In Philips Electronics, the Court held that UK national legislation excluding the transfer of domestic losses incurred by a branch of a non-resident company to a resident company of the same group violates the freedom of establishment. And in Felixstowe Dock, the Court found it to be an infringement on the freedom of establishment where UK legislation required the “link company” to be a resident in order to facilitate a loss transfer between a company belonging to a consortium and a company that is a member of a group.

One can derive from those decisions that the different (technical) characteristics of the various group taxation regimes (e.g., consolidation by disregard of group entities or by transfer of profits or losses) may not lead to different outcomes of the cases. Also, it does not make a difference how many tiers of intermediate non-resident EU-companies are interposed between a resident

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40 Paras. 50-52 of the judgment.
41 Paras. 53-54 of the judgment.
42 Para. 55 of the judgment, referring to para. 42 of the judgment.
43 Paras. 53-54 of the judgment.
44 Case C-418/07, Papillon, EU:C:2008:659.
45 Case C-18/11, Philips Electronics, EU:C:2012:532.
46 Case C-80/12, Felixstowe Dock and Railway Company et al, EU:C:2014:200.
47 See also para. 65 of AG Kokott’s opinion, comparing the French tax integration at issue in Papillon and the Dutch “fiscal unity” regime at issue in the present case.
parent and a resident sub-subsidiary,\textsuperscript{48} as each of the intermediate companies exercises its freedom of establishment and each lower-tier company can also derive rights from that freedom.\textsuperscript{49}

9. **Comparability.** As in some of the more recent cases,\textsuperscript{50} the Court first identifies the “restriction”, which, in the field of taxation law, exists if establishment is hindered by a disadvantageous difference in treatment of an establishment in another Member State in comparison with a purely domestic establishment.\textsuperscript{51} Second, under the heading “justification for the restriction” it asks if such difference in treatment either relates to situations which are not objectively comparable or can be justified by an overriding reason in the public interest.\textsuperscript{52} Finally, of course, the national measure must be proportionate, i.e., it must not go beyond what is necessary to attain that objective.\textsuperscript{53} In line with its settled case law,\textsuperscript{54} the Court confirms that the objective comparability of situations must be assessed having regard to the aim pursued by the provisions at issue,\textsuperscript{55} i.e., in the case of the Dutch “fiscal unity” regime, the (advantageous) consolidation of profits and losses of the various group members.\textsuperscript{56} Hence, and in line with Papillon,\textsuperscript{57} the Court rejected arguments against the comparability of domestic and cross-border situations in the present case: As the Dutch regime does not offer any possibility at all to form a fiscal unity if the “link” company is non-resident (and has no permanent establishment in the Netherlands), it is not decisive that also in a purely domestic setting a group \((1)\) between a parent and a sub-subsidiary could not be formed without including the intermediate subsidiary and \((2)\) between two sister companies without including the common parent company.

10. **Justification.** Unlike in Papillon, the Court in SCA Group Holding BV et al rejected the coherence of the Dutch “fiscal unity” regime for a lack of a direct link between tax advantage (loss utilization) and disadvantage (neutralisation of decreases in value of shareholdings in group companies). This was because in Dutch legislation a general (and not a group-specific) rule denied the tax-effective depreciation of shareholdings in group companies and hence prevented the double use of losses that may occur by taking into account \((1)\) the losses of the sub-subsidiary directly and \((2)\) the loss-related decrease in value of the parent’s holding in the non-resident intermediate company.\textsuperscript{58} Contrary to the information apparently provided to the Court by the Dutch Government,\textsuperscript{59} the participation exemption is not applicable in cases of a switch over or liquidations; moreover, the Court did not consider a potential double loss utilization via debt claims which a parent company may have against its foreign intermediate subsidiary. In any event, Papillon has established quite a high hurdle for proportionality with regard to less intrusive measures that would allow companies “to establish that there is no risk of losses being used twice”.\textsuperscript{60} It should also be noted that the Court in SCA Group Holding BV et al did not address a Member State’s

\textsuperscript{48} Para. 26 of the judgment.
\textsuperscript{49} The Court has explicitly held that a company may, for tax purposes, rely on a restriction of the freedom of establishment of another company which is linked to it in so far as such a restriction affects its own taxation; see, e.g., Case C-18/11, Philips Electronics, EU:C:2012:532, para. 39; Case C-80/12, Felixstowe Dock and Railway Company et al, EU:C:2014:200, para. 23.
\textsuperscript{50} See, e.g., Case C-80/12, Felixstowe Dock and Railway Company et al, EU:C:2014:200, para. 25, and Case C-18/11, Philips Electronics, EU:C:2012:532, para. 17.
\textsuperscript{51} See Case C-418/07, Papillon, EU:C:2008:659, paras 16-23.
\textsuperscript{52} Para. 28 of the judgment, referring to Case C-80/12, Felixstowe Dock and Railway Company et al, EU:C:2014:200, para. 25, and, indirectly, to Case C-18/11, Philips Electronics, EU:C:2012:532, para. 17.
\textsuperscript{53} See, e.g., Case C-418/07, Papillon, EU:C:2008:659, paras 52-62.
\textsuperscript{54} Para. 28 of the judgment. See also, e.g., Case C-418/07, Papillon, EU:C:2008:659, para. 27; Case C-337/08, X Holding, EU:C:2010:89, para. 22; Case C-18/11, Philips Electronics, EU:C:2012:532, para. 17; Case C-80/12, Felixstowe Dock and Railway Company et al, EU:C:2014:200, para. 25.
\textsuperscript{55} Para. 28 of the judgment. See also, e.g., Case C-418/07, Papillon, EU:C:2008:659, para. 27; Case C-337/08, X Holding, EU:C:2010:89, para. 22; Case C-18/11, Philips Electronics, EU:C:2012:532, para. 17; Case C-80/12, Felixstowe Dock and Railway Company et al, EU:C:2014:200, para. 25.
\textsuperscript{56} Para. 29 of the judgment.
\textsuperscript{57} Case C-418/07, Papillon, EU:C:2008:659, paras 21, 23-26.
\textsuperscript{58} For a discussion on whether those are the “same” losses see para. 53 of AG Kokott’s opinion.
\textsuperscript{59} See para. 39 of the judgment.
\textsuperscript{60} See, e.g., Case C-418/07, Papillon, EU:C:2008:659, paras 52-62.
preservation of powers of taxation with regard to symmetry between the right to tax profits and the right to deduct losses.\textsuperscript{61} While such argument has been accepted as legitimate to safeguard symmetry between the right to tax profits and the right to deduct losses,\textsuperscript{62} it does not hold in cases where the consolidation of resident companies is concerned, i.e., the use of domestic losses, because – as the Court had noted in \textit{Papillon} – “the question which is put relates to the taking into account of losses recorded in one and the same Member State, which also excludes, prima facie, a risk of tax avoidance”.\textsuperscript{63} Indeed, the power of the Member State “to impose taxes is not at all affected by the possibility of transferring, by relief and to a resident company, the losses sustained by another company, since the latter is also resident for tax purposes in that Member State”.\textsuperscript{64}

11. \textit{EEA States}. As the freedom of establishment also applies in the EEA (Art 31 of the EEA Agreement), intermediate companies and parent companies resident in EEA Member States must likewise be covered by the holding of the Court in \textit{SCA Group Holding BV et al}.

12. \textit{Third-State Issues}. “Tax integration” regimes are generally, by virtue of their holding requirements (e.g., a 95% shareholding in the Dutch fiscal unity regime), intended to apply only to those shareholdings which enable the holder to exert a definite influence on a company’s decisions and to determine its activities. This means that only the freedom of establishment but not the freedom of capital movement with its \textit{erga omnes}-effect may apply to those situations.\textsuperscript{65} It must, moreover, be kept in mind that the provisions on the freedom of establishment cannot be relied on by a company established in a third State.\textsuperscript{66} That said, in \textit{SCA Group Holding BV et al}., the Court did not have to address the question whether it would arrive at different results if (1) the Dutch parent company was owned by a resident of a third-State, (2) the common parent of two resident sister companies was a resident of a third-State or (3) the intermediate company was a resident of a third-State. As for the first issue, however, it becomes clear from the Court’s case law, that the status of being an EU company “is based, under Article 54 TFEU, on the location of the corporate seat and the legal order where the company is incorporated, not on the nationality of its shareholders”.\textsuperscript{67} As for the second issue, the Court in \textit{Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation} has already made it forcefully clear that the freedom of establishment would not apply, as the common third-State parent company is not an “EU company” within the meaning of Art 54 TFEU and hence not protected by Art 49 TFEU.\textsuperscript{68} And as for the third issue, one must likewise conclude that the creation of a Dutch subsidiary by a third-State intermediate company is not protected under the freedom of establishment.

13. \textit{Practical Implications}. Neither AG \textit{Kokott} nor the Court had to be concerned with technical issues, especially the question how consolidation (which, in the Dutch “fiscal unity” regime, is effected at the level of the parent company) should take place if the common parent of two resident sister companies is resident in another Member State and has no permanent establishment in the Netherlands. These technical issues are a matter for domestic tax law and double tax treaties. AG \textit{Kokott} explicitly pointed out that “the question of in which company the tax entity consolidation takes place is purely technical and irrelevant as far as the attainment of the objective of the regime is concerned. If the effects of a tax entity formed between the subsidiaries can be

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{61} For a rejection of that argument where domestic losses are concerned, see Case C-418/07, \textit{Papillon}, EU:C:2008:659, paras 38-40, Case C-18/11, \textit{Philips Electronics}, EU:C:2012:532, paras 25-26, and Case C-80/12, \textit{Felixstowe Dock and Railway Company et al}, EU:C:2014:200, para. 30.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{62} See, e.g., Case C-414/06, \textit{Lidl Belgium}, EU:C:2008:278, para. 33.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{63} Case C-418/07, \textit{Papillon}, EU:C:2008:659, para. 39.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{64} Case C-80/12, \textit{Felixstowe Dock and Railway Company et al}, EU:C:2014:200, para. 30; see also Case C-18/11, \textit{Philips Electronics}, EU:C:2012:532, paras 25-26.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{65} See para. 17 of AG \textit{Kokott}'s opinion, referring to Case C-35/11, \textit{Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation}, EU:C:2012:707.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{66} See, e.g., Case C-452/04, \textit{Fidium Finanz}, EU:C:2006:631, para. 25; Case C-80/12, \textit{Felixstowe Dock and Railway Company et al}, EU:C:2014:200, paras. 39.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{67} Case C-80/12, \textit{Felixstowe Dock and Railway Company et al}, EU:C:2014:200, paras. 40.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{68} Case C-524/04, \textit{Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation}, EU:C:2007:161, paras 96-99.}
made possible in principle, the question of the taxable person to which the operating result is ultimately attributed is of secondary importance.”69 The Court confirmed.70

IV. The Statement

14. The Confédération Fiscale Européenne welcomes this judgment, as it confirms that non-discriminatory consolidation between resident companies must be granted even if “linking companies” are resident in another EU or EEA Member State.

15. The Confédération Fiscale Européenne expects Member States, where necessary, to establish substantive and procedural rules to facilitate practical implementation of this judgment of the Court, in particular with regard to the consolidation of resident sister companies of a common EU or EEA parent company.

69 Para. 77 of AG Kokott’s opinion.
70 Para. 51 of the judgment.